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TAXES AND TORTS
Joseph M. Dodget
INTRODUCTION
Section 104 of the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") ex-
cludes from gross income recoveries for physical or nonphysical
personal injuries, whether by way of damages, insurance, or settle-
ment.1 Section 104 was amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1989 ("OBRA '89") to expressly eliminate the punitive
damages exclusion for nonphysical injuries. 2 Whether section 104
currently excludes punitive damages for physical injury, however, is
somewhat unclear.3 The 1989 amendment seems to be based on
the erroneous, or at least doubtful, assumption that punitive dam-
ages generally fall within the section 104 exclusi-n. 4 Punitive dam-
t William H. Francis, Jr., Professor, University of Texas School of Law. I wish to
thank Doug Laycock, CalvinJohnson, Mark Gergen, Bill Powers, and Daniel Shaviro for
their helpful comments on this and earlier drafts. The seed for this Article was planted
in J. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 107-17 (1989). This piece is not to be confused with
Bertram Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 616 (1952), or with RobertJ. Henry,
Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REV.
701 (1986).
1 I.R.C. § 104 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
2 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7641(a),
103 Stat. 2106 (1989).
3 See Mark W. Cochran, 1989 Tax Act Compounds Confusion over Tax Status of Personal
Injury Damages, 49 TAx NoTEs 1565 (1990).
4 The 1989 Act, supra note 2, was drafted against the background of the Tax Court
decision in Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (reviewed), a case of first im-
pression, which squarely held punitive damages to be excluded under § 104. However,
Miller was reversed after the 1989 Act became effective. Commissioner v. Miller, 914
F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990). Another pre-1989 case, Burford v. United States, 642 F. Supp.
635 (N.D. Ala. 1986), reached a similar result as the Tax Court decision in Miller. Bur-
ford, however, is distinguishable because it involved wrongful death damages which were
labelled "punitive" under Alabama law but were compensatory in nature. After 1975,
the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") conceded that punitive damages were ex-
cludible under § 104. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. However, the IRS reversed its
position in 1984. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. Technically, the Court of Appeals'
decision in Miller pertains to § 104 as it existed prior to OBRA '89. Nevertheless, OBRA
'89 does not expressly deal with punitive damages for physical injury, suggesting that
Congress was deferring to the courts on this issue. Congress would have been naive to
suppose that one Tax Court decision on appeal-a decision contrary to the IRS' pub-
lished position-represented settled law. Moreover, to read OBRA '89 as confirming
the holding of the Tax Court in Miller would appear to violate the principle of separation
of powers. It is not the function of congressional committees to decide issues not ad-
dressed by the statutory text. See Hart v. United States, 585 F.2d 1025, 1030, 1035 (Ct.
Cl. 1978) (en banc); Miller v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1988) (text of
statute controls over contrary intent in Conference Report). Further, congressional de-
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ages aside, the exclusion encompasses recoveries representing lost
earning capacity, lost past earnings, pain and suffering, and medical
and legal expenses not deducted in a prior year.5 Moreover, the
term "personal injury" has been defined broadly to encompass
"tort-like" actions such as employment discrimination 6 and civil
rights violations. 7
This Article deals only tangentially with current doctrinal issues
under section 104.8 Its main purpose is to examine whether tax pol-
icy, alone or in conjunction with policies of tort law, justifies the
exclusion of any component of a personal injury recovery.9 Past at-
cisions as to certain issues do not imply solutions to issues not addressed. See Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969) (statutory exclusions from definition of "scholarship" in
I.R.C. § 117 do not prohibit courts from limiting the definition of scholarship in similar
situations). Cf Gulf Oil v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974) (deletion of a
provision by the Conference Committee is not grounds for upsetting judicial construc-
tion). Other examples of erroneous or doubtful congressional assumptions concerning
the status ofjudge-made tax law are found in I.R.C. § 195, which assumes that the costs
of expanding a going business are expenses, and in I.R.C. § 274(b), which assumes that
certain nongifts are excludible gifts under I.R.C. § 102. This is not a case where con-
struing § 104 not to cover punitive damages for physical, as well as nonphysical, injuries
would render § 104 incoherent or even awkward. In sum, the courts should not hesitate
to extend the Court of Appeals holding in Miller to post-1989 law.
5 Recoveries of expenses deducted in a prior year are includible under § 104(a)
unless the deduction failed to produce a tax benefit. Recoveries for nondeductible legal
expenses are excludible. Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
6 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case addressing whether
back-pay damages in a federal sex discrimination action are excludible as "personal inju-
ries" under § 104. See Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3136 (1991). E.g., Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir.
1990) (age discrimination recovery is for personal injury). Cf. Kurowski v. Commis-
sioner, 917 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1990) (involving wrongful teacher dismissal, and recov-
ery not for personal injury); Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989)
(involving Equal Pay Act, and recovery not for personal injury).
7 Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987) (violation of taxpayer's First
Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
8 For doctrinal discussion, see Joseph W. Blackburn, Taxation of Personal Injury
Damages: Recommendations for Reform, 56 TENN. L. REv. 661 (1989); Jennifer J.S. Brooks,
Developing a Theory of Damage Recovery Taxation, 14 WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 759, 791-805
(1988); J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal
Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MoNT. L. REV. 13 (1989); Patricia J. Morgan, Old
Torts, New Torts, and Taxes: The Still Uncertain Scope of Section 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875
(1988).
9 See generally Brooks, supra note 8, at 760-80 (arguing that damages should be tax-
free only when they are a substitute for tax-free receipts, especially as they relate to
human capital); Douglas K. Chapman, No Pain - No Gain? Should Personal Injury Damages
Keep Their Tax-Exempt Status?, 9 U. ARK. LrrrLE RocK LJ. 407 (1986-87) (arguing that
§ 104 should be repealed as to recoveries for lost earnings); Mark W. Cochran, Should
Personal Injury Damage Awards Be Taxed?, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 43 (1987) (arguing for
complete repeal of § 104); Lawrence A. Frolik, Personal Injury Taxation As a Tax Preference,
37 ME. L. REV. 1 (1985) (arguing that § 104 should be repealed insofar as it relates to
lost earning capacity); Malcolm L. Morris, Taxing Economic Loss Recovered in Personal Injury
Actions: Toward a Capital Idea?, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 735 (1988) (advancing ad hoc compro-
mise solutions); Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-tax Policy Considera-
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tempts to justify the exclusion have been insufficient, leading some
commentators to call for its repeal.10 This Article argues that the
inclusion-exclusion dichotomy is a misleading way to frame the is-
sue. Resolution of this issue should be sensitive to both federal tax
policy and state tort policies. Thus, a better solution is to design a
tax rule that achieves the twin goals of (1) substantive tax equity
among recipients of recoveries, and (2) remedy neutrality with re-
spect to various competing rules for computing recoveries. In this
context, "substantive tax equity" means that plaintiffs should be
placed in the same post-tax economic position after receiving the
recovery as they would have been in if the injury had not occurred,
regardless of the particular technique employed by state law to com-
pute the recovery. I "Remedy neutrality" means that states should
be able to adapt their compensation rules to various notions regard-
ing the efficient regulation of defendants' conduct.
The concepts of substantive tax equity and remedy neutrality,
while apparently incompatible, can converge on the plaintiff's side
under the rubric of "compensation." 1 2 In tort law the term "com-
pensatory damages" encompasses recoveries for both economic
harms, such as medical expenses, lost wages, and earning capacity,
and noneconomic harms, such as pain and suffering, and humilia-
tion.13 This Article, however, uses the term "compensation" more
narrowly to refer to "pecuniary" damages designed to restore the
status quo ante of the injured party in strictly economic (human capital)
terms.' 4 "Compensatory" recoveries for noneconomic harms will
be dealt with separately.1 5 On the defendant's side, the principal
policy of tort law is to create disincentives to socially harmful con-
tions, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701 (1977) (arguing that § 104 makes sense for cash
recoveries related to nontaxable values but the lost earnings exemption should be
repealed).
10 See authorities cited, supra note 9.
11 As used herein, "tax equity" is not to be confused with the well-known maxim of
"horizontal equity." Horizontal equity posits that persons in the "same position"
should pay the same taxes, but it fails to prescribe any methodology for determining the
"position" of taxpayers. In contrast, "tax equity," as used herein, prescribes a "substan-
tive" standard for comparing taxpayers who receive personal injury recoveries; that of
"full restoration of human capital."
12 See infra notes 71-77, 99-101, 111-13 and accompanying text.
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 901(a), 903, 905 (1977). Obviously,
tort law fails to achieve this aim insofar as the transaction costs of obtaining any recov-
ery, even legal fees, are borne, under the "American rule," by the plaintff-even when
the plaintiff is successful. Id. § 914. This problem cannot plausibly be solved by federal
tax law.
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 903 cmt. a, 906 cmts. a & c, 910, and 913A
(1977).
15 See infra notes 183-214 and accompanying text (arguments that such damages
should be included).
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duct. 16 However, opinions differ as to the appropriate degree of de-
terrence, 17 and states can adapt their tort laws to embody these
differences. At present, no federal policy exists which imposes a
uniform national tort law, nor do existing federal tax deduction
rules embody such a policy indirectly.18 This Article focuses on the
tax side of the tax-tort boundary. It highlights the differing views on
tort-side deterrence policy, without advocating any view as the cor-
rect one. The Article explicates the interplay between tax and tort
remedy rules, demonstrating that a variety of tort remedy rules with
differing impact on defendants, may reach the same plaintiff-side re-
sult-full compensation for human-capital loss.
Section 104 forces states' 9 to choose between overcompensat-
ing plaintiffs and potentially underburdening defendants. 20 Yet, re-
peal of section 104 would create the inverse situation, forcing states
to choose between undercompensating plaintiffs and overburdening
defendants. 2 1 In other words, retention or repeal of section 104
forces tort law to "adapt" to tax law in order to achieve economic
compensation of plaintiffs, a result which may impose the "wrong"
burden on defendants. It is not inevitable that federal tax law must
operate in this manner. One solution is to make federal tax rules
adaptive to state tort remedy rules; this achieves "correct" compen-
sation for plaintiffs in all cases while simultaneously allowing states
to pursue varying deterrence policies. 22 Specifically, the adaptive
approach suggested in this Article produces a set of federal tax rules
that treat lost earning capacity damages and lost wages variably, ac-
cording to the method used to compute damages under state law.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1977). A secondary tort law policy
is punishment. Punishment and deterrence are not logically compatible, for one is a
means to a behavioral end, while the other is a nonbehavioral end in itself. Punishment
is briefly discussed infra at note 141.
17 See Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficency in Tort Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (1987).
18 Basically, the deductability of recoveries, as well as liability insurance premiums,
hinges on whether the plaintiff's claim arose from the payor's business or investment, as
opposed to "personal" activities. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 212, and 262 (1988 and Supp.
1990); see also id. § 162(g) (certain damages under antitrust laws not deductible). In ap-
propriate cases, where the payment was made in a transaction in which the payor ac-
quired property or a long-term benefit, a damages payment might be a nondeductible as
a capital expenditure. Snively v. Tomlinson, 303 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1962). The capital
expenditure would create a basis that will eventually be recovered through depreciation
or loss deduction, or offset against amount realized in computing gain. See id. §§ 167(a),
165(a), (c), 1001(a), (b), and 1016(a)(1).
19 As used herein, the word "state" means any government, including the United
States, the District of Columbia, and possessions, which has tort rules and remedies.
20 As will be pointed out, a compensation regime that ignores the effect of taxes has
the effect of overcompensating plaintiffs, while taking taxes into account converts a po-
tential plaintiff windfall into a reduction in the amount that the defendant must pay.
21 See infra notes 136-37, 144-56 and accompanying text.
22 See infra Table 2, notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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In some cases, a full exclusion of lump-sum and periodic-payment
recoveries is actually warranted. 23 Since neither pain and suffering
nor punitive damages compensate for economic loss, and therefore
cannot be burdened by any "implicit" tax, traditional tax policy con-
siderations should control. These considerations would render
such recoveries fully includible.24
I
RECOVERIES PERTAINING TO HUMAN CAPITAL
At the core of section 104 is the issue of recoveries for injuries
to "human capital," i.e., damages for lost wage-earning capacity, in-
cluding recoveries for lost past wages. Both historic and present-
day theories of exclusion (or inclusion) ultimately derive from a con-
ception of human capital. Human capital is the key to distinguishing
personal from commercial injuries in situations where they might be
seen to overlap; thus, it holds the key to defining the proper scope
of section 104. After a brief review of other theories, this section
considers the proper role of section 104 from first the plaintiff's
viewpoint, and then the defendant's.
A. Prior Theoretical Approaches to Section 104
One theory which might exclude damage recoveries views the
purpose of the tax base, or taxable income, as an allocation of the
national income "pie" among taxpayers. National income is limited
to economic activity that generates gain or profit. Such income can-
not result from a mere transfer, which would include damage recov-
eries of all kinds as well as gratuitous transfers. 25 As a matter of
positive law, this view has never had a substantial influence. Clearly
receipts of transfers are includible unless specifically excluded; if
such receipts were not considered "income," specific exclusions
would not be necessary.26
On the normative level, the "pie" theory is generally inferior to
other theories such as the "ability to pay" and "standard of living"
23 See infra Table 2.
24 See infra notes 183-217 and accompanying text.
25 See Norman H. Lane, A Theoiy of the Tax Base: The Exchange Model, 3 Am. J. TAX
PoL'Y 1 (1984).
26 Gifts and bequests are excludible under I.R.G. § 102(a), and life insurance pro-
ceeds are excludible under I.R.C. § 101(a). Commercial cash subsidies are includible
unless excluded under I.R.C. § 126. Alimony is includible, but child support is not
under I.R.C. § 71(a), (c). Unemployment compensation benefits are includible under
I.R.C. § 85, and Social Security retirement benefits are included, in part, under I.R.C.
§ 86. Other government welfare benefits are excluded under, or by analogy to,
§ 102(a). See Rev. Rul. 76-131, 1976-1 G.B. 16. Intra-family support is probably exclud-
ible on the theory that taxing the payor is a sufficient proxy for taxing the payee. See
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
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theories for constituting an income- or consumption-tax base.27
However, it is not necessary to develop justifications for these alter-
native approaches here, since the "pie" theory itself has no norma-
tive foundation. "National income" and even "income" are not
self-justifying as tax-base norms. The argument for an approach
that would limit the tax base to economic, as opposed to individual,
gains and profits must proceed on a nonnormative basis as follows:
An income tax, necessarily being less than the gain, would not pre-
vent the gain-producing transaction from occurring.28 Of course, a
tax system should not prohibit profitable activity, but it does not
follow that only profitable activity can be taxed. No economic ra-
tionale exists for precluding taxation of transfers, including damage
recoveries, that must occur for various reasons, such as death, moral
constraint, or law.
Even under a pie theory, a transfer would be untaxed, net, if
inclusion by the recipient were combined with a deduction for the
payor. Therefore, the pie theory can never be a sufficient justifica-
tion for an exclusion for damages received unless the payment of
damages and liability insurance premiums were categorically nonde-
ductible. Since no such nondeductibility rule or principle exists, 29
the exclusion of section 104 cannot stand on this basis alone. In any
event, no pervasive tax principle links inclusion or exclusion by the
recipient to deductibility or nondeductibility by the payor.30
A second possible explanation for section 104 is that Congress
wants to provide a federal subsidy to personal-injury plaintiffs.3 '
However, this explanation is not supported by any legislative his-
tory.3 2 If Congress was so motivated, it acted arbitrarily by re-
warding plaintiffs who receive recoveries,33 while precluding loss
27 See, e.g., JOSEPH DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAx 95-129 (1989). See also U.S. TREAS.
DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 21-52 (1977).
28 See Lane, supra note 25, at 18-19.
29 See supra note 18.
30 See Duberstein v. Commissioner, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). Section 274(b), which
disallows deductions for excludible gifts, would not be necessary if such a principle
existed. Any link between includibility and deductibility would exist only in the area of
intra-family gifts and support.
31 See Blackburn, supra note 8, at 668-69; Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444
U.S. 490, 501 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). However, no
evidence bearing on legislative intent is cited, and the idea that the purpose of a statute,
such as that of § 104, can be divined from one of its possible effects is a logical fallacy,
especially where, as here, tort recovery rules can be designed that shift the tax savings
from the plaintiff to the defendant.
32 As no serious attempt has been made to repeal § 104, no legislative history exists
pertaining to its retention. It is hard to discern any political constituency for repeal,
because both plaintiffs and defendants variously benefit from the exclusion. See infra
note 97 and accompanying text.
33 Though punitive damages are excessive in terms of compensation, their current
status under § 104 with respect to physical injuries remains unclear. See supra notes 3-4
[Vol. 77:143
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deductions for nonrecovering injured parties. Conceivably, section
104 might have been premised on a perception that successful per-
sonal injury plaintiffs are systematically undercompensated.3 4 This,
however, would have been an empirical question, and it is unlikely
that current empirical evidence was available to the 1918 Congress.
Moreover, even if such evidence were cited as a reason for not re-
pealing section 104 today, it would be unpersuasive, unless the un-
dercompensation bore a necessary relation to tax rates. The wide
fluctuation of tax rates in the last seventy years,3 5 and the significant
variation in marginal rates applicable to different plaintiffs in the
same taxable year, makes such a hypothesis implausible. A blanket
exclusion thus would be inequitable among persons who received,
and were denied, adequate compensation. Further, a subsidy ra-
tionale for section 104 would expose it to the usual barrage of criti-
cism aimed at tax expenditure provisions in general.3 6
Interestingly, the section 104 exclusion is not an item listed in the
tax expenditure budget,3 7 suggesting that Congress does not view it
as a tax subsidy. Finally, the subsidy rationale for section 104 has
been rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Norfolk & West-
ern Ry. Co. v. Lieplt.38
and accompanying text. Thus, to hold that § 104 excludes such punitive damages is to
impute an irrational motive to Congress. Arguably, pain and suffering damages are, or
can be, excessive because no objective standard is available by which they can be
measured.
34 See RichardJ. Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regu-
lation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1293-1296 (1980); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing.Away with
Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 558, 593-94 (1985). Many recipients of punitive, and pain and
suffering damages are surely overcompensated.
35 See STANLEY S. SURREY Lr AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS
34 (1972).
36 Frolik, supra note 9, at 7-8. See generally STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS To TAX
REFORM (1973) (discussing "tax expenditure" concept). Systematic undercompensation
would suggest tort reform before reliance on the tax system, thereby sparing the federal
treasury from bearing the burden of defects in the compensation system.
37 See, e.g., STAFF OFJOINT COMM'N ON TAXATION, TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1984-1989 (Nov. 1984), reprinted in JOSEPH M. DODGE, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 785-94 (1985).
38 444 U.S. 490, 496 n.10 (1980). Liepelt, in construing the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act ("FELA'), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), held that the trial court erred in exclud-
ing evidence of the effect of federal income taxes on the decedent's estimated future
earnings, and in refusing to instruct the jury that the recovery would be excludible
under § 104. The majority opinion stated:
The dissent takes the position that § 104(a)(2) ... "appropriates for the
tortfeasor a benefit intended to be conferred on the victim or his survi-
vors." ... But we see nothing in the language and are aware of nothing
in the legislative history of § 104(a)(2) to suggest that it has any impact
whatsoever on the proper measure of damages in a wrongful-death ac-
tion. Moreover, netting out the taxes that the decedent would have paid
does not confer a benefit on the tortfeasor any more than netting out the
decedent's personal expenditures. Both subtractions are required in or-
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A third possible explanation for section 104 assumes that if at
least one significant component of a recovery, such as pain and suf-
fering damages, is excludible on theoretical grounds, then the blan-
ket exclusion obviates the need to differentiate among various
components of the recovery-an extremely difficult task, especially
in the case of settlements. However, this rationale equally supports
the position that recoveries should be totally includible if the
argument for excluding any particular component is weak or the ex-
cludible component is secondary to the dominant includible compo-
nent(s). 39 Alternatively, the difficulties of differentiation may be
overstated.40
Although not controlling as far as a policy discussion is con-
cerned, it would be interesting to know Congress's intent when en-
acting the predecessor of section 104 in 1918.4 1 Curiously, the
exclusion did not appear in the first modern federal income tax
law. 42 One possibility is that the original concept of gross income
excluded nonregular receipts, such as windfalls. 48 Another is that
income was viewed through the lens of either business or trust ac-
counting, which emphasizes a clear-cut distinction between capital
and income, often expressed in the "fruit and tree" metaphor.
Under this view, a recovery for personal injury is not "fruit," or in-
come, but compensation for loss of part of the "tree," 44 or capital.
der to determine "the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might
have reasonably received .. " [citation omitted.]
Id.
Liepelt means that § 104 should not produce a windfall to plaintiffs under a tort
regime that mandates recovery for pecuniary loss. Of course, a given tort regime may
not have such a limited mandate; the overcompensation of plaintiffs that would occur by
not only failing to reduce future wage streams by future taxes but also, more specula-
tively, by failing to inform juries that damages are excludible, is a choice made by tort
law. Such overcompensation is not mandated by § 104 as an expression of federal tort
policy. The Supreme Court subsequently held that Liepelt stated the general federal
common-law rule. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 486-87 (1981).
39 This Article argues that nonpecuniary damages should be includible, see infra
notes 183-217 and accompanying text, and that pecuniary recoveries should be includi-
ble under certain scenarios, see infra notes 71-126 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
41 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
42 Income Tax Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 16, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166 (1913).
43 This concept was prevalant during the period from 1900 to 1920. See H.R. REP.
No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1918) (suggesting that recoveries are not "income"
within the 16th Amendment). See generally E.R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAx 19-22,
677-85 (2d ed. 1914) (notion of income around the time of the 16th Amendment and
the 1913 enactment of an income tax law excluded nonrecurring receipts). See also Haw-
kins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A.M.(P-H) 1023 (1927) (damages for libel not income be-
cause not derived from capital or labor); McDonald v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A.M.(P-H)
1340 (1928), acq., (same result for damages for breach of contract to marry).
44 In 1918, the U.S. Attorney General, answering a Treasury Department inquiry,
stated that life insurance proceeds were capital, not income. This ruling apparently in-
duced the Commissioner to rule that personal injury recoveries were likewise not in-
[Vol. 77:143
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These primitive conceptions of income began to lose influence
around 1920. 45 It is now understood that the gross income of a tax-
payer includes any "accession to wealth clearly realized" unless
there is an express exclusion, thereby abolishing any notion that in-
come must be regular or recurring.46 Replacement of capital is now
dealt with explicitly by the "basis" mechanism.47 The application of
this mechanism to personal injury recoveries is discussed below.
Application of the accession-to-wealth idea initially seems to in-
dicate that any recovery (net of medical costs) should be included in
gross income. At this point, because no Code provision or other
rule generically deals with damage recoveries, standard tax doctrinal
analysis asks whether what is replaced by the damages would be in-
cludible or excludible. 48 Application of this "substitute for" ap-
proach also seems intuitively fair. The purpose of damages is
economic restoration, and the taxpayer should be treated in the way
that best approximates the treatment that would have occurred if
the injury had not taken place. At first it seems plausible to include
recoveries relating to lost earning capacity, because they represent
an acceleration of includible wages. However, the recovery can
equally be characterized as the loss of an asset, namely, wage-earn-
ing capacity, commonly referred to as "human capital," the present
value of which is determined with reference to lost future wages.49
come. T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918). See also Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1930).
45 Merchants' Loan Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 (1921) (gain from casual
sale of investment was includible as gross income). See generally Madjorie E. Kornhauser,
The Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got To Do Witt, It?, 55 Sw. LJ. 869 (1985)
(discussing concepts of income in first quarter of 20th Century).
46 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, reh'g denied, 349 U.S. 925 (1955)
(punitive damages in commercial tort cases are gross income).
47 Conceptually, "basis" is constituted by expended dollars that have previously
been subject to income tax, for example, as wages. The purpose of the basis mechanism
is to prevent the same dollars from being taxed twice to a given taxpayer. The paradigm
is where one who earns $10,000 wages, which are taxed, buys property for the same
$10,000 (a cost which is a nondeductible-capital expenditure under I.R.C. § 263), and
subsequently sells the property for $13,000. Only the gain of $3,000 (excess of sales
proceeds over basis) is income. See I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a) (1988 and Supp. 1990).
See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
48 E.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944) (commercial damages).
49 Id. (commercial damages were for loss of an asset, namely, business goodwill,
even though such damages were measured by lost future income). Whether one charac-
terizes a future income stream as an acceleration of future income or as an asset is not a
question of philosophy or semantics; it is strictly a tax issue. The concept of income
contains normative models of investment and human capital, and of the income from
each. See discussion infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the
analysis below is not ultimately contingent on the choice between the lost wages and the
lost asset approaches, because the crucial facts are whether the future wages are com-
puted on a before-tax or after-tax basis and whether a before-tax or after-tax discount
rate is used.
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In fact, shortly after enactment, the predecessor of section 104
was rationalized according to this lost asset approach, but in an in-
adequate way. In Solicitor's Opinion 132,50 the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice stated that, because personal rights are not transferable and
possess no market value, a recovery for a rights' violation does not
result in gain to the recipient.5 1 This version of the replacement-of-
asset theory is now regarded as obsolete.52 As discussed above, the
tax concept of gain is relative to that of basis, not value.53 The tax-
payer has the burden of proving the existence and loss of basis.54
Some might argue that a person has a basis equal to the sum of
human-capital expenditures, which might include suich items as out-
lays for food, education, preventive health care, vitamins, and min-
erals. 55 Unfortunately, no one keeps track of these outlays, nor
would it be feasible to do so. Most (or all) of the foregoing are non-
deductible personal expenses and not capital expenditures. 56 At
this point the sentimentalist would argue that the taxpayer, given
the unfortunate circumstance of being injured, should be given the
benefit of the doubt by a presumption that the basis lost as a result
of the personal injury equals the amount realized. 57 However, the
"basis equals recovery" argument produces nonsensical results for
very young taxpayers. In addition, it is inconsistent with other tax
rules, including the tax system's normal treatment of human capi-
50 I-1 C.B. 92 (1922).
51 This rationale is not an application of the pie theory, supra notes 25-30 and ac-
companying text, because the latter looks to social gain whereas Solicitor's Opinion 132
looks to whether the taxpayer alone incurred a gain.
52 Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33 (revoking Solicitor's Opinion 132, supra note
50). The I.R.S. has acknowledged that the basis of any exclusion is § 104, not a
common-law theory of income. Id.
53 I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988 and Supp. 1990). Basis is cost derived from nondeduct-
ible capital expenditures or income inclusions with respect to the asset itself (as opposed
to distributions, etc., from the asset). Id §§ 1011, 1012, 1016(a). See generally DODGE,
supra note 27, at 21-46 (discussing the function of basis).
54 E.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denid,
323 U.S. 779 (1944) (taxpayer failed to prove existence of basis). Cf Starrels v. Com-
missioner, 304 F.2d 574, 576-77 (9th Cir. 1962) (stating that the theory behind § 104 is
that restoration of lost capital is not income, while elsewhere acknowledging necessity of
basis). Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), and Inaja Land Co. v. Commissioner, 9
T.C. 727 (1947), acq., 1948-1 C.B. 2, are two well-known cases which stand for the prop-
osition that recoveries come first out of basis, even if the taxpayer cannot demonstrate
any loss of earning capacity. These cases, however, are now obsolete on this point. Fi-
nancial theory dictates that basis should be recovered only when there is a true loss of
earning capacity. See, e.g., DODGE, supra note 27, at 238-73. In any event, the issue with
personal injury recoveries is whether any basis exists in the first place.
55 See generally Paul B. Stephan, III, Federal Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA.
L. REv. 1357 (1984) (discussing tax treatment of human capital outlays and income
therefrom).
56 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (1958).
57 Cf. Inaja Land Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 727 (1947), acq., 1948-1 C.B. 2.
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tal.58 If a personal injury involves a loss of human capital, then it
follows that there should be a deduction for uncompensated per-
sonal injury losses; however, no such deduction exists.59 Further, if
one has basis in human capital, there should be depreciation deduc-
tions to offset wages, but again none exist.60
On the merits, human capital should not be treated as a con-
ventional asset with basis. Not only is it impossible to keep track of
costs, but there are also conceptual problems. By what coherent
principle would one distinguish between the capital expenditure
and the expense portions of food, education, etc.? Is human capital
used in business to earn wages, or is it held for personal consump-
tion to enjoy life? Does a person's human capital include only that
which is self-purchased, or can it also be acquired by transfer from
parents, government, and the like?61 If it is acquired by transfer,
can it plausibly be added to basis if its value is not included in in-
come when received?62
Of course, the tax system could be restructured to require tax-
payers to include in income the present discounted value (in excess
of cost) of future wage-earning capacity as it is acquired.63 The ba-
sis resulting from the inclusions could then be amortized against ac-
tual wages, and any unamortized basis could be deducted as a loss at
death or upon retirement. This scheme, however, would be ex-
tremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to implement in a reasonable
manner.64 It would violently clash with the concept that the tax base
should have some reference to a taxpayer's ability to obtain funds to
58 See Blackburn, supra note 8, at 663-68.
59 Although here there would be no independent basis for ascertaining the amount
of the loss, as distinguished from the recovery situation, such amount could be deter-
mined in the tax proceeding itself, as would be necessary in figuring a loss with respect
to conventional property. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1)(i) (1960).
60 Normally, with depreciation it is necessary to know the amount of such basis, but
in lieu of such knowledge some crude approximation method could be designed. Cf.
I.R.C. § 613 (1988 and Supp. 1990) (percentage depletion for natural resources).
61 See John K. McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax
Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1973).
62 In general, the indusion in income of an asset received in kind creates basis
equal to the amount includible. An exdudible receipt can yield a basis equal to value,
but only if Congress so stipulates, or if the exclusion is dearly intended to be perma-
nent. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 358(a), 362, 722, 723, 1031(d), 1033(b), 1034(e), 1041 (1988
and Supp. 1990) (basis in tax-free in-kind receipt or exchange not equal to value). If the
exclusion derives from § 102 (gifts) or the support exclusion, see infra text accompanying
note 205, the recipient should have a carryover basis, not a stepped-up basis. See
§§ 1015 (gifts), 1041 (inter-spousal transfers). Contra, § 1014 (bequests).
63 Thus, in the case of education, the amount includible would be the excess of the
present value of the education in terms of enhanced wage-earning power over the cost
of the education to the taxpayer.
64 For example, would each job promotion be an accession of human capital? What
about the accretion of seniority? Continuing education? If one were fired or laid off,
how much of a "loss," if any, would be sustained? What depreciation schedule would be
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pay the tax.65 Thus, a heavy tax liability would become due at vari-
ous stages, i.e., birth, completion of education, and new jobs and
promotions. No bank would lend money to the taxpayer at these
times to enable the taxpayer to pay the tax, because the bank could
not obtain any security for this type of loan, and the taxpayer may
not have the legal capacity to borrow commercially. A person can-
not sell herself into slavery, nor can contracts for personal services
be specifically enforced. Even if the tax could be deferred until the
wage-earner achieves liquidity, with interest running in favor of the
Treasury,66 such a deferral scheme would be extremely burdensome
administratively and would subject the government to severe risks
as an unsecured creditor over long periods of time. Also, with the
amounts included in income as well as amortization deductions
based on estimates, such calculations could be wildly inaccurate.
However, compensating adjustments, feasible only when the "trans-
action is closed," might be too late to meahingfully benefit the tax-
payer or the government for gross over- or under-taxation on a
year-to-year basis. Finally, taxing human capital differently from in-
vestment capital cannot be considered a serious defect in the tax
system unless: (1) one is more favorably taxed than the other over-
all,67 (2) investment in one is preferable to investment in the other
in terms of social welfare, 68 (3) the two are essentially the same,69
and (4) significant elasticity exists between the two. 70 In sum,
appropriate, considering that wages generally rise with age? It would be mind-boggling
to attempt to sort out these issues on an individual basis.
65 The tax-base norm of ability to pay, which encompasses wealth and consump-
tion, is not, however, synonymous with liquidity to pay the tax in cash. See DODGE, supra
note 27, at 133-35.
66 See Mary L. Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 722
(1990), for a discussion of an income tax regime that would treat deferral of income,
mainly under the "realization" principle as involving the deferral of tax with interest.
67 Professor McNulty expresses doubt as to which regime is more favorable. In-
vestments are subject to double taxation, but human capital expenditures are never ac-
counted for. McNulty, supra note 61, at 22-26. However, because accretions to human
capital are not taxed either, human capital is arguably treated more favorably than in-
vestment capital. On the other hand, persons who invest in their own human capital are
in a less favorable position tax-wise than persons who acquire the same human capital
from third parties. The former suffer from denial of deductions; the latter acquire tax-
free benefits.
68 Human capital, whether in the form of knowledge and skills or the creation of
new technology, is viewed in the economics literature as the primary engine of economic
growth. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICs 685-95 (11 th ed. 1980).
69 Clearly, they are not the same in liquidity terms, because human capital is diffi-
cult to "realize." Although some individuals might have access to unsecured credit, few
lenders would lend up to 80% of such a borrower's earning capacity, reduced to present
value, as is common even with illiquid property, such as real estate.
70 I do not intend to debate the merits of a "consumption" versus an "income" tax.
Nevertheless, under a consumption tax no basis in either human capital or investments
would exist.
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human capital, or wage, income should be taxed only when re-
ceived, and human capital basis should be disregarded.
B. Restoring the Plaintiff's Economic Status Quo
1. Should Recoveries for Lost Earning Capacity Be Excluded?
Although the conventional replacement-of-capital theory can-
not sustain an exclusion for personal injury recoveries, an exclusion
with respect to lost earning capacity can be justified under certain
circumstances by using financial concepts. Financial analysis deter-
mines, under various alternative assumptions regarding state law,
what tax treatment for lost earning capacity recovery would best
replicate what would have occurred had there been no personal in-
jury.7' The legitimacy of this aim will be examined in due course.
But first some numerical examples must be laid out.
Initially, without the personal injury, the taxpayer would have
received wages over the shorter of: (a) the duration of the injury,
(b) the period until expected retirement, or (c) the taxpayer's life.
The measure of the lost earning capacity, and therefore the "cor-
rect" amount of any lump-sum recovery, is the present discounted
value of such wages. 72 In computing such recovery, state law must
address two points: (1) whether the wages being discounted are fig-
ured before or after putative federal income taxes,73 and (2)
whether the discount rate is applied before or after taxes.74 If the
recovery itself is in the form of an annuity designed to mimic the
stream of lost wages, no discounting is required.75
71 Under present law, a plaintiff receiving a personal injury recovery in the form of
periodic payments receives such payments tax-free, notwithstanding the fact that some
part of the payments may represent interest. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 and Supp. 1990)
("whether as lump sums or as periodic payments"). Such a periodic-payment right is
called a "structured settlement." This exclusion for interest can be lost if the settlement
is "funded" by a lump-sum payment in a way that the "constructive receipt" or "eco-
nomic benefit" doctrines apply. See Blackburn, supra note 8, at 684-85.
72 The present value of a future amount is figured under the formula: PV=
A_ where "A" is the future amount, "r" is the annual. monthly, or daily discount
(1+ r)"
rate expressed as a decimal, and "n" is the number of periods (years, months, days)
between the present and the future receipt. The present value of a wage stream is the
sum of the present value of all future wages.
73 If the wages are reduced by future taxes, the "A" in the present-value formula is
reduced. For example, if wages are $50,000 and the tax rate is 3017, each "A" is
$35,000 [$50,000-(.30 x $50,000)].
74 The before-tax discount rate is the rate of return (before taxes) on readily avail-
able nonrisky assets. The after-tax discount rate is such rate reduced by the applicable
marginal tax rate. Thus, if the before-tax discount rate is 10% and the marginal tax rate
is 30%, the after-tax discount rate is 7% [107o-(.3 x 10%)]. See DODGE, supra note 27, at
218-19 and 327-28.
7' Another possible state law issue is whether the decision-maker should consider
the tax treatment of the recovery. As demonstrated below, this is a false issue. See infra
note 140 and accompanying text.
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Two issues also arise regarding taxes: (1) whether the recovery
should be tax free and (2) whether any resulting stream of annuity
payments should be (a) fully taxed, (b) exempt from tax, or (c) taxed
like an investment taking the form of a debt obligation. 76 The cur-
rent rules for taxing annuities under section 72 will not be applied
here, as they represent an inaccurate approach to taxing debt
obligations. 77
An analysis of the various permutations of assumptions and tax
results reveals at least four scenarios, i.e., combinations of state
remedy regimes and federal tax treatments, which are compatible
with the section 104 exclusion and which will leave the taxpayer in
the same economic position as if the personal injury had never
occurred:
(1) Scenario (1): the recovery (or settlement) is in the form of
periodic payments rather than a lump sum, and each payment
equals the amount that the taxpayer would have received net
of federal income taxes.
(2) Scenario (2): the lump-sum recovery is computed, under ap-
plicable tort law, on a before-tax basis using a before-tax dis-
count rate, and the annuity payments are taxed in full, with no
basis offset.
(3) Scenario (3): the lump-sum recovery is instead computed on
an after-tax basis, again using a before-tax discount rate, and
the annuity payments are fully exempt from tax.
(4) Scenario (4): the lump-sum recovery is again computed on an
after-tax basis, this time using an after-tax discount rate, and
the annuity payments are taxed subject to a basis offset.
Table 1, below, presents the results of this analysis under col-
umns (1) through (4) respectively.
76 The tax norm for a debt obligation is that any receipt is deemed to come first out
of earned but unpaid income, calculated by applying the interest rate against the then
principal balance, which, when used to discount all future payments to the date the debt
was incurred, yields the amount of such debt. Only the excess of such receipt over in-
come is a recovery of basis. See Prabel v. Commissioner, 882 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1989);
Rev. Rul. 83-84, 1983-1 C.B. 97.
77 Under I.R.C. § 72 the basis, and any resulting taxes, would be prorated over time
in the ratio of annual annuity payments to total expected annuity payments. I.R.C.
§ 72(b) (1988 and Supp. 1990). Where the annuity payments are level, this method
produces the same results as straight-line depreciation. The financially correct approach
is to treat annuities the same as level-payment mortgages. That is, under the "declining
balance method," any payment first comes out of accrued, but unpaid, interest and the
remainder comes out of the remaining principal. See supra note 76. Thus, the income
portion and the tax are greater in the first year, and decline thereafter because a greater
portion of each successive payment is allocated to principal. Therefore, the after-tax
amounts increase over the same period.
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TABLE 1
TAX-FREE DAMAGE RECOVERIES
SCENARIOS (see above)
computational steps (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) lump-sum recovery - $248,685 $174,08078 $183,702
(2) taxes on (1) - 0 0 0
(3) amount invested
[(1) - (2)] - 248,685 174,080 183,702
(4) total annuity
payments 79  210,000 300,000 210,000 $221,607
(5) annuity payments
subject to tax 0 300,000 0 37,90580
(6) total taxes
[30% of (5)] 0 90,000 0 11,371
(7) amount left
[(5) - (6)] 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,236
(8) allocation of (7)
yr 1 70,000 70,000 70,000 68,35881
yr 2 70,000 70,000 70,000 70,023
yr 3 70,000 70,000 70,000 71,855
(9) present value of
(8) at 7%82 $183,702 $183,702 $183,702 $183,702
The following factual assumptions are made for clarity of
illustration:
(i) the taxpayer has lost exactly three years of earning capacity;
(ii) the taxpayer would have earned wages of $100,000 a year,
payable in full at the end of each year;
(iii) the applicable income tax rate is 30%;
(iv) the before-tax discount rate is 10%; and
(v) given that the tax rate is 30%, the after-tax discount rate is
7%.
78 $174,080 is the present value, at 10%, of an annuity consisting of three annual
payments of $70,000.
79 In columns (2), (3), and (4), this number is derived by dividing the amount
invested (line 3) by the 10% annuity factor for three years (2.4869) and multiplying the
result by 3.
80 The aggregate basis offset is $183,702, the amount invested.
81 The before-tax annuity payment for each year is $73,869 (I/3 of $221,607). The
"income" portion of each payment is computed in the manner described in note 76,
supra. Thus, at the end of year 1, the accrued but unpaid interest on $183,702 (at 10%0)
is $18,370, producing a tax of $5,511 and an after-tax sum of $68,358. If$18,370 of the
$73,869 is income, the remaining $55,499 is reduction of principal (basis), so that the
income portion in year 2 (and the tax) is reduced, yielding a greater after-tax amount.
82 The discounting at line (9) can be at any discount rate, so long as it is the same
discount rate across the board, since the purpose here is simply to compare the present
values of future amounts under alternative scenarios. Under any discount rate, the
numbers in line (9) would be equal.
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Therefore, without the personal injury, the taxpayer would have re-
ceived $210,000 after taxes over the three-year period (70% of
$300,000), the present value of which at a 10% discount rate is
$248,685 and at a 7% discount rate is $183,702. The computa-
tional assumptions are: a 10% before-tax discount rate in columns
(2) and (3), a 7% after-tax discount rate in column (4), and an annu-
ity computation in line (4) which assumes a 10% before-tax rate of
return and equal annuity payments at the end of each year, all such
rates to be compounded on an annual basis.
One variation of Scenario (2), referred to as Scenario (2A),
more closely adheres to familiar tax concepts; that is, the lump-sum
recovery is fully taxed but the annuity payments are exempt from
tax.8 3 Furthermore, two additional methods reach the same end re-
sult. The first, designated as Scenario (5), involves a lump-sum re-
covery computed on the basis of before-tax wages discounted using
an after-tax discount rate. The lump-sum recovery is includible in
gross income and the annuity stream is taxed as a debt obligation.8 4
The second method, designated as Scenario (6), involves a periodic-
payment recovery figured on a before-tax basis. The annuity pay-
ments are taxed in full. Scenarios (5) and (6) are compatible with a
full repeal of section 104. Table 2 presents the full array of six sce-
narios producing a wage-mimicking outcome.
TABLE 2
WAGE-REPLACING DAMAGE RECOVERIES
Steps (1) (2A) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) - 248,685 174,080 183,702 262,431 -
(2) - 74,605 0 0 78,729 -
(3) - 174,080 174,080 183,702 183,702 -
(4) 210,000 210,000 210,000 221,607 221,607 300,000
(5) 0 0 0 37,905 37,905 300,000
(6) 0 0 0 11,371 11,371 90,000
(7) 210,000 210,000 210,000 210,236 210,236 210,000
(8)
yr 1 70.000 70,000 70,000 68,358 68,358 70,000
yr 2 70,000 70,000 70,000 70,023 72,023 70,000
yr 3 70,000 70,000 70,000 71,855 71,855 70,000
(9) $183,702 183,702 183,702 183,702 183,702 183,702
83 Scenario (2) would be idiosyncratic tax-wise in disallowing any basis recovery
(amortization) against a wasting investment asset (the annuity). Income exemptions, on
the other hand, are not uncommon. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 103, 104(a)(2) ("structured,
settlemeniit").
84 For a discussion of the taxation of debt obligations, see supra note 76.
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These results can be summarized as follows:
(1) For periodic-payment recoveries (Scenarios (1) and (6)), the
payments should be fully excluded if the recovery is computed
after taxes; otherwise it should be fully included.
(2) For lump-sum recoveries invested in annuities, Scenarios 2A,
3, 4, and 5:
(a) the lump-sum recovery should be excluded if the recovery
is figured on an after-tax basis; otherwise it should be
fully included; and
(b) the annuity payments should be fully excluded if the re-
covery is calculated using a before-tax discount rate;
otherwise they should be treated as payments upon a
debt obligation.
To a modest extent, these results rationalize the present section
104 exclusion. Essentially, the exclusion is justified where the re-
covery is calculated by reducing the future wages by the putative
income taxes thereon. The taxpayer already bears an implicit tax on
the wage-stream substitute, and it is axiomatic that wages are only to
be taxed once. The foregoing also justifies the tax-free "structured
settlement" 85 involving an annuity provided directly by or through
the defendant. Virtually all commentators have argued that the an-
nuity income under a structured settlement should not be exempt
because, in order to compensate for the delay in payment, the total
payout will be greater than what the lump sum would have been.
According to these commentators, this implicit interest income
should be included, similar to other forms of implicit interest.86
The present analysis, however, contradicts this assertion. The ex-
emption for the implicit interest does not give the taxpayer any un-
due overall economic advantage provided that a before-tax discount
rate is used to compute the putative lump-sum recovery. By reduc-
ing the recovery, the before-tax discount rate effectively imposes an
implicit tax on the income portion of the annuity. 87
The foregoing analysis, however, falls short ofjustifying section
104 in its present form. First, the present section 104 exclusion is
not conditioned on the taxpayer actually securing an annuity to re-
85 See supra note 71.
86 Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergence of l.R.C. § 104(a)(2), Norfolk & Western Rail-
way Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements: Tax Policy "Derailed," 51 FORDHAM L. REv.
565 (1983). See Blackburn, supra note 8, at 690. Imputed interest is identified and sub-
ject to tax in various other situations under I.R.C. §§ 171, 483, 1272, 1274, 1275, and
7872.
87 An "implicit tax" is an amount that reduces a taxpayer's net return but which is
not actually transferred to the government. To illustrate, suppose $100,000 is invested
at 10% before taxes for one year. The income of $10,000 is taxed at 30%, yielding
107,000 after taxes, the same result as if the $100,000 had been invested at 7% tax free
for the same period.
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place the wage stream. Although any implicit taxes will have been
"paid" by the plaintiff even if an annuity is not purchased or re-
ceived, given the aim of restoring the plaintiff's status quo ante, it
seems reasonable to require that the recovery approximately repli-
cate the wage stream in form.88 Second, section 104 does not allow
an exemption for the income portion of an annuity purchased with a
lump-sum recovery, even in cases where an implicit tax has already
been imposed on such income by calculating the recovery using a
before-tax discount rate as exemplified in Scenarios (2A) and (3).
Tort law typically, if not universally, provides that recoveries are to
be calculated with reference to the before-tax wage stream,8 9 but
only a few jurisdictions have displayed any awareness of the dis-
count-rate issue.90 In this respect, then, section 104 achieves the
correct result haphazardly.91 Third, insofar as plaintiff equity is con-
sidered the dominant remedy policy, section 104 puts pressure on
states to adopt an after-tax damages rule using, in the case of lump-
sum recoveries to be invested in an annuity, an after-tax discount
rate as illustrated in Scenario (4).92
So far, exclusions with respect to damage recoveries make sense
from a policy perspective only if one assumes that the appropriate
equity norm is restoration of the taxpayer to her wage-earning status
88 I am not arguing for a mandatory structured settlement. Plaintiffs' lawyers
would resist such a policy, because their contingency fees would be deferred. Under my
proposal, the plaintiff who receives a lump sum is required to purchase an annuity as a
condition of obtaining any tax exclusion.
89 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A(2) (1977). Representative of the ma-
jority position is Johnson v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 519
N.E.2d 326 (N.Y. 1988). An after-tax computation has been endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980), discussed supra
note 38. Cf. Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968) (commer-
cial damages not excluded under § 104 figured on a before-tax basis). See generally John
F. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages
in Personal Injury or Death Actions, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 589 (1982 & 1990 Supp.).
90 See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 547-48 (1983),
superceded by statute as stated in Eape-Picher Industries, Inc. v. United States, 846 F.2d 888
(3d Cir. 1988) (stating, inter alia, that discount rate should be after-tax); Shaw v. United
States, 741 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Culver v. Slater Boat Co., 688 F.2d
280 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), withdrawn in part, 722 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1983); O'Shea v.
Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1982) (effects of inflation on discount
rate considered). These decisions ignore the actual tax implications of the discount-rate
issue. The comments to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 913A (1977), implicitly
refer to before-tax discount rates without further exploration of the issue.
91 If § 104 were amended so as to condition the exclusion of a lump-sum recovery
upon mandatory reinvestment in a (tax free) annuity, then Scenario (3), which uses a
before-tax discount rate, would replace Scenario (4) as the proper recovery model.
92 Under the present tax scheme, the annuity income would be taxed. See supra note
77. The Supreme Court in Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 495
(1980), in requiring that future wages be figured on an after-basis, casually states that
"[l]ogically" an after-tax discount rate should be used. An after-tax discount rate is only
logical if the applicable tax rule would tax the annuity income on the lump sum.
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quo ante. This result occurs because of implicit taxes arising from
the way recoveries are sometimes computed. These implicit taxes
detrimentally affect the taxpayer, but at the same time yield no ben-
efit to the government. The implicit-tax rationale for exclusion
would not persuade someone who believes that "implicit tax" never
justifies the conferral of a tax benefit. I agree with the proposition
that implicit tax is generally a bad reason for conferring a tax exemp-
tion. If the implicit tax idea were given free reign, tax exemptions
would become the norm and the income tax revenue base would
disappear.93 A system that exempts certain' forms of economic re-
turn but not others would spawn allocative inefficiencies. 94 An
implicit-tax approach to personal injury recoveries, however, would
not hemorrhage the tax system, or necessarily produce economic
inefficiencies. 95 The existence of tax benefits for personal injury re-
coveries would not induce potential plaintiffs to "demand" a signifi-
cantly greater frequency of personal injuries. 96
Although the section 104 exclusion is compatible with damage
computation rules that consider the effect of hypothetical future
taxes, such rules also have the effect of reducing the amounts that
defendants, and their insurers, must pay. Thus, retention of section
104 in its present form appears to provide a stronger federal tax
incentive for tortious conduct than either outright repeal or the pro-
posed modification of section 104 would. Of course, states can ig-
nore the incentive effect of current section 104, but doing so would
be at the cost of providing windfall recoveries to plaintiffs who are
compensated for lost human capital on a before-tax, and after-tax
discount rate, basis.97 If the goal of plaintiff equity is deemed para-
mount, two courses of action are possible: (1) retaining current sec-
tion 104 combined with the states' bringing their tort regimes in
line, thereby reducing the burden on defendants across the board-
an unlikely prospect 9 8 -or (2) amending section 104 to accommo-
93 For example, if all investment returns were exempt, business could provide the
same net rate of return to investors by lowering the dividend, interest, rental, and roy-
alty rates (this reduction would be the implicit tax). The implicit tax would be captured
by the payors, not the government. In addition, if implicit taxes were treated as real
taxes, there would be pressure to repeal I.R.C. § 265, which disallows deductions for
expenses of producing tax-free income.
94 Businesses offering tax-free returns would have.a competitive advantage in rais-
ing capital, because their cost of raising capital would be lowered relative to that of other
businesses. Excessive economic resources would congregate in tax-favored businesses.
95 See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
96 Id.
97 See Patricia C. Bradford, Measuring Tort Damages for Loss of Earnings without Deduct-
ing Income Taxes: A Wisconsin Rule Which Has Lost Its Rationale, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 210, 214-
20 (1987).
98 Many states have declined to follow Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444
U.S. 490 (1980), discussed supra at note 38. See Theuman, supra note 89.
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date those state policies that would impose greater burdens on
defendants, as illustrated by Scenarios (2A), (5), and (6). The de-
fendant-burden aspect of the equation, which, in economic terms, is
essentially that of affecting the "supply" of tortious conduct is dis-
cussed below. 99
The "plaintiff equity" approach is based on the notion that tax-
payers should be treated the same regardless of whether they re-
ceive wages or an equivalent substitute in the form of damage
recoveries. One might ask why taxpayers should be treated the
same in fact when they are arguably different. One is actually re-
ceiving wages, while the other, directly or indirectly, is investing.
Indeed, Scenarios (2A), (3), (4), and (5) involve the actual reinvest-
ment of the lump-sum recovery into an annuity. The distinction be-
tween human and investment capital is helpful in analyzing the
equity issue, because it is axiomatic that human capital is treated
differently, under an income tax, from investment capital, which is
"taxed twice."1 00
Initially, one might argue that, in the case of invested lump-sum
recoveries, the results described in Scenarios (2A), (3), (4), and (5)
above do involve double taxation although in the Scenarios (2A), (3),
and (4) one or both of the taxes involved is merely implicit; that is,
the tax(es) result from the calculation of the recovery. In taxpayer
equity terms, an implicit tax is just as good as an explicit tax.101
Established tax doctrine is compatible with applying the
human-capital model here to achieve plaintiff equity. For instance,
one can analogize the taxpayer's situation to that of an "involuntary
conversion of property." Congress, in section 1033, has expressly
provided that an involuntary conversion is not a "realization" event
if the proceeds of the conversion are reinvested in "similar or re-
lated in service or use" property within a certain period of time.102
Of course, section 1033 is technically distinguishable in that it in-
volves conversions of property rather than human capital. How-
ever, section 1033, like the exclusions with respect to personal
99 See infra notes 142-65 and accompanying text.
100 Investments are normally made with after-tax dollars because capital expendi-
tures creating or purchasing investments are not deductible. I.R.C. § 263(a) (1988 and
Supp. 1990). This nondeductible cost of the investment is, in financial terms, the pres-
ent discounted value of all future receipts, the net income portion of which will be taxed
again when accrued or received. Human capital is not systematically taxed twice in the
same manner: Accretions to human capital may or may not be taxed, but wage income is
taxed on a gross basis, not on a "net" basis after amortizing human capital, which is
nonexistent.
101 See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations Drive
Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 19-31 (HenryJ. Aaron & MichaelJ. Bos-
kin eds., 1980).
102 I.R.C. § 1033 (1988 and Supp. 1990).
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injury recoveries, would be justified by a concern that similarly
situated investors be taxed the same, even though one investor un-
derwent an involuntary disposition-reinvestment transaction. Of
course, the section 1033 analogy strongly reinforces the suggestion
that any exclusions with respect to lump-sum recoveries be contin-
gent on reinvestment in a wage-replacing annuity. Involuntariness
also negates the possibility of tax-avoiding behavior. For example, a
concert pianist would not suffer a mutilated hand to convert from a
wage-earner to an investor, nor could she reconvert into a wage-
earner at will.'03
Even if the conversion were voluntary, tax doctrine supports re-
covery exclusions linked to reinvestments. True, the usual ratio-
nales for declining to tax unrealized gains, i.e., the possible difficulty
of valuation and the absence of liquidity to pay taxes, do not apply
to the recipient of a damage recovery. However, the rationale be-
hind numerous "voluntary" nonrecognition-of-gain provisions in
the Code is that the original realized investment continues in a new
"form," and applies to a damages recovery linked with mandatory
reinvestment in a wage-replacing annuity.10 4 Although any nonrec-
ognition rule with respect to property is properly subject to criticism
by those already hostile to the realization principle, 10 5 the justifica-
tion for a nonrecognition rule for conversions of human capital is
much stronger. Tax law does not otherwise acknowledge the possi-
bility of gain or loss with respect to acquisitions or dispositions of
human capital. 10 6
103 The argument is not that an involuntary receipt should be excluded per se. In
general, involuntariness does not necessarily result in the most favorable tax treatment
imaginable. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941) (loss is capital loss even
though involuntary). On the other hand, involuntariness is a common rationale for stat-
utory tax benefits. See I.R.C. § 1231 (1988 and Supp. 1990) (recognizing involuntary-
conversion gains and losses produce, crudely-speaking, capital gains and ordinary
losses). Also, involuntariness underlies, to some extent, the personal deductions for
medical expenses, casualty losses, taxes, and, possibly, the dependency exemptions. Id.
§§ 151(c), 164, 165(c)(3), 212(3) and 213. See DODGE, supra note 27, at 117-29. Cf Joel
S. Newman, The Deductibility of Nondiscretionary Personal Expenses, 6 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 211
(1987) (arguing that, although the involuntary nature of an expense should not create
personal deductions, the discretionary nature of expenses otherwise deductible should
bar the deduction).
104 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 108, 354, 721, 1031, and 1034 (1988 and Supp. 1990). Some of
these are limited to exchanges; no rule exists that generally allows tax-free rollovers of
property. The "exchange" requirement ties in weakly with anti-tax-avoidance and non-
liquidity concerns, and is fairly easy to enforce.
105 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL.
L. REV. 397, 407-12 (1987).
106 See supra text accompanying notes 58-60. See generally Mark Gergen, Pooling or
Excho:,ge: The Taxation ofJoint Ventures between Labor and Capital, 44 TAx L. REV. 519, 544-
50 (1989) (arguing that receipt of rights to future cash in exchange for agreement to
perform future services should not be treated as a realization event; cash should be
taxed as wages only as received).
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An even closer analogy than the property nonrecognition rules
is supplied by section 83, which provides that a wage-earner can vol-
untarily convert to being an investor without imposition of tax. For
example, currently an employee is not taxed upon the receipt of in-
kind compensation, usually stock of the employer, as long as the
employer is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.10 7 Insofar as
forfeitability is tied to continuing employment, and thereby subject
to employee control, arguably no true conversion from employee
to investment status has occurred. The same can be said for a
lump-sum recovery subject to mandatory reinvestment in a wage-
replacing annuity. The annuity differs only in that it maintains, by
proxy, the wage-earner's "stock" of human capital as an employee
in general, as opposed to a particular employment relationship.
Another possible analogy exists under the section 83 rule,
whereby a services-provider can even defer vested compensation in-
come until receipt, as long as the deferred-compensation right is
unfunded and unsecured.108 Thus, in the implausible event that the
taxpayer forgoes a lump-sum recovery in favor of an unfunded and
unsecured promise to receive periodic payments, as might occur in
Scenarios (1) and (6), the annuity payments should be taxed only
when received, not when the right to the annuity accrues. Neverthe-
less, for the reasons described immediately above, deferral of tax in
Scenario (6) should not depend on whether the annuity is in fact
unfunded; that would simply be an additional reason in this situation
for not treating the receipt of the annuity right as a taxable event. 109
Whether to tax the annuity payments should hinge on whether the
payments are set on a before- or after-tax basis.
These analogies may be subverted if one disagrees with the pol-
icy decisions embodied in section 83. The analogies, however, are
not central to the argument, especially because they point to a non-
107 I.R.C. § 83(a) (1969).
108 "Unfunded" means that the employee does not own a vested interest in an in-
vestment, account, escrow arrangement, or trust for the exclusive benefit of the em-
ployee. In this case, the employee does not receive "property" within the meaning of
§ 83. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (as amended in 1985). A borderline case is the receipt, by
one performing services for a partnership, of a pure-profits interest devoid of any liqui-
dation rights in the partnership. Diamond v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 530 (1971), aff'd,
492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974); Campbell v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 236 (1990),
rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991). See Gergen, supra note 106. Cf.
I.R.C. § 467(g) (1988 and Supp. 1990) (providing for taxing of implicit interest on cer-
tain deferred compensation arrangements).
109 This proposition is not inconsistent with cur.cnt law, under which compensation
for past and present services is taxed to the employee if such compensation takes the
form of a "nonqualified" funded promise to pay cash in the future. I.R.C. §§ 83(a),
402(b) (1988 and Supp. 1990).
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realization result in all cases.110 This Article argues only that per-
sonal injury recoveries and earnings thereon should be excluded in
some cases. In sum, equity considerations appropriately view the tax
treatment of the recovery in terms of "maintaining" the taxpayer's
converted human capital.'' When the plaintiff is "overcompen-
sated" because the recovery is figured on a before-tax basis or on
the basis of an after-tax discount rate, or both, the federal govern-
ment may appropriately "skim off" the windfall. By taxing the re-
covery according to the various Scenarios set forth in Table 2, the
government will skim off exactly the right amount and still leave the
plaintiff whole. 112 Unlike any other possible approach to personal injury
recoveries, a set of tax rules modeled on Table 2 will harmonize with
state compensation regimes to produce a uniform national result,
net of taxes, for similarly situated injured parties, whether the recov-
eries are received in a lump sum or otherwise." 3
The proper tax treatment of recoveries for lost past wages is
easily discerned. Because no future amounts are discounted to
present values, the only relevant consideration is whether the recov-
ery for lost wages is computed, under state law, on a before- or af-
ter-tax basis."14 In the before-tax case, the recovery should be
taxable, and in the after-tax case, it should not.
If a recovery is awarded under a schedule disregarding calcula-
tions involving future or past wages, as might occur under workers
compensation and disability insurance plans, federal law should still
follow the wage-replacement paradigm. Even when applicable state
law does not replace lost human capital, federal tax law should pre-
sume equivalent treatment under the law; that is, the tax law should
"first" view the recovery for a personal injury compensable under
110 See Brooks, supra note 8, at 769-80 (arguing for across-the-board nonrecognition
rule).
111 See supra text accompanying note 71.
112 Although the injured party will not obtain full "net" restitution because of the
conventional American rule that costs, including attorneys' fees, are borne by each liti-
gant, the tax law cannot feasibly overcome this deficiency. In tax terms, costs borne by
the plaintiff can be viewed separately as an expense rather than a reduction in the recov-
ery. See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
113 Varying comparative negligence or fault regimes will tend to reduce plaintiff re-
coveries below the present value of future lost wage streams and create state-by-state
disparities among recoveries for the "same" personal injuries. Federal tax law can do
nothing about such disparities, nor can it compensate for lost damage recoveries. All
that I claim is that federal tax law is capable of treating a recovery for lost earning capac-
ity the same after taxes as if the plaintiff had received the "recoverable" lost future
wages that would have been received but for the injury.
114 The case for computing the recovery on a before-tax basis, however, is not
strong. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A cmt. c (1977) (noting stronger
case for computing lost past wages on an after-tax basis, because factual uncertainties
are absent). Cf. Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50 (§ 104 applied even when recovery is
for lost past wages).
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the otherwise applicable tort law. This rule would require an in-
dependent determination of lost earning capacity, under applicable
assumptions, on the tax return. In theory, making the determina-
tion should not be especially difficult, although in practice it might
be complex. 1 5 Of course, any interest accrued on judgments or
damage recoveries-for past due amounts should be treated as in-
cludible interest. 116
At this point, it is appropriate to offer statutory language with
respect to lost earning capacity and earnings, to replace what is cur-
rently in section 104(a):
(a) In General- Except in the case of amounts attributable to
(and not in excess of) deductions allowed under Section 213 (re-
lating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross
income shall not include, under regulations prescribed by the Sec-
retary, such amounts received as damages (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or periodic payments),
under worker compensation acts, or through accident, health, or
disability insurance (other than amounts received by an employee,
to the extent such amounts are (A) attributable to contributions
by the employer which were not includible in the gross income of
the employee, or (B) are paid by the employer) on account of per-
sonal injuries or sickness as are necessary to restore the injured or
sick person, with respect to lost earning capacity and lost earn-
ings, to the same economic position as would have occurred had
the personal injury not occurred, but in the case of any lump-sum
recovery only to the extent that it be invested in an annuity that
provides level (or increasing) payments for a period which is to
end no earlier than the earlier to occur of (i) 20 years, (ii) the
attainment by the injured party of age 70, or (iii) the death of the
injured party.
The regulations would incorporate the results of Table 2, which
are keyed to state law. Determining state law may not always be
easy, but this is a pervasive problem of federal law under the Erie
doctrine. The determination here, however, would be made by an
administrative body in the first instance and not by a federal court.
In marginal or doubtful cases, 1 7 the regulations should operate on
115 Rarely would a plaintiff recover more than the present value of the lost earning
capacity and lost wages. Therefore, perhaps there should be a presumption that the
entire recovery is for lost wages or wage-earning capacity.
116 For example, if any interest rate is fixed by statute and is below a rate which is
one percentage point above the current after-tax rate, computed with reference to the
applicable federal rate, such interest should arguably be tax-free also: it has been sub-
ject to an implicit tax, even though the low interest rate results from statutory obsoles-
cence rather than any notion of an after-tax return. Imposing a complex rule with
respect to such a relatively insignificant feature of the recovery is probably not worth the
benefit gained.
117 See supra notes 89-90.
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the basis of presumptions that recoveries are figured before taxes
and that discount rates are before-tax. 1 8 The taxpayer should be
barred from showing that a particular recovery was calculated on a
basis different from that prescribed by the regulations because the
parties could sweeten the pie at the government's expense,1 9 given
that the parties would not be adverse to each other in this con-
text.120 However, the taxpayer would still be allowed to show that
the regulations' characterization of state law was incorrect.
2. Deductibility of Legal Fees
The proposed revision of section 104 would fall short of pro-
ducing the optimal result in terms of injured-party equity, because
part of the recovery is likely to be eaten by legal fees and other ex-
penses. 12 1 The tax law could not guarantee that the injured party
will be made economically whole except by way of a 100% tax credit
for attorneys' fees-a possibility that can be confidently ruled
out.' 22 Tort law must decide whether the injured party should pri-
marily bear the transaction costs, as is the case under the so-called
"American rule," or whether the unsuccessful defendant should
bear them. 123
The best that tax law can reasonably be called upon to accom-
plish here would be to allow the deduction of nonrecovered attor-
neys' fees, which do not represent "consumption," as an expense of
producing income' 24 or, alternatively, as an expense pertaining to
the maintenance or repair of human capital.' 25
118 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A (1977) (general rule is that taxes
are ignored).
119 If recoveries are excludible when damages are computed on an after-tax basis,
the parties would likely settle on such a basis, thereby making more money available to
the defendant, who might be induced to share it with the plaintiff.
120 The plaintiff would favor an after-tax computation of wages and a before-tax
discount rate in order to avoid income taxes on both the recovery and the investment
return. Similarly, the defendant would favor the same approach to minimize the amount
payable. See Scenario 3 in Table 2.
121 A facile response would say that attorney fees are "made up" by the award for
pain and suffering and, perhaps, punitive damages. Such a result, however, would occur
only by coincidence.
122 In Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490,495-96 (1980), the Court
opined that the plaintiff's recovery under the FELA should not be inflated (by comput-
ing wages on a before-tax basis and by failing to note that recoveries are tax-free) in
order to make up for attorneys' fees; the latter is a separate issue under tort law.
123 In economics jargon, the social harm resulting from personal injuries is not ade-
quately "internalized" by potential tortfeasors unless tort law requires them to bear the
"appropriate" burden of such costs. See also infra text accompanying notes 152-63.
124 I.R.C. § 212(1) (1954).
125 Compare I.R.C. § 213(a) (medical expenses) with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (expenses
of maintaining or improving existing job skills are deductible as expense of carrying on
existing business of being an employee).
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However, the case for deductibility is not strong. Capital ex-
penditures for acquiring human capital are never deductible, and
the aim of the revised section 104 would attempt to treat the recov-
ery as if it were a tax-free replacement of human capital. It is true
that the fees do not become an annuity acquisition cost just because
the exclusion is conditioned upon a reinvestment in an annuity. 126
Even if the legal fees were treated as a cost of acquiring the an-
nunity, they would not be added to the taxpayer's basis in the annu-
ity (the lump-sum excluded amount); they would be absorbed into
it.127 The most accurate description is that the legal fees reduce the
recovery. As under present law, the legal fees should be deductible
only to the extent that the recovery is includible.128
The best argument for deductibility is that the proposed revi-
sion of section 104 excludes recoveries only to the extent that they
have implicitly been subject to tax. Admittedly, the implicit tax point
also supports repeal of section 265(a)(2), which expressly disallows
interest expense on debt incurred to purchase or carry obligations
yielding exempt interest under section 103.129 Perhaps the section
265(a) (2) situation is distinguishable.13 0 On the other hand, the im-
plicit tax rationale has never succeeded in avoiding section 265.131
A feature of the proposal, however, precludes deductibility of
the legal fees. That feature is the rule that sets the maximum ex-
cludible amount for a lump sum recovery (to the extent of the rein-
126 By analogy, prepaid interest on a mortgage is allocated to the loan period; it is
not added to the basis of property acquired with the mortgage. See I.R.C. § 461(g)
(1988 and Supp. 1990).
127 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-4(a)(1) (as amended in 1972) (basis of property
acquired in a part-gift, part-sale transaction is the greater of the cost or the § 1015 carry-
over basis, not the sum of the two).
128 I.R.C. § 265(a)(1) (1988 and Supp. 1990); Rev. Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18.
129 The implicit tax arises because the rate of return on municipal obligations is less
than that of taxable debt obligations.
130 There the implicit tax is typically less than what would be derived from the high-
est marginal rate of the particular investor. The yield on § 103 bonds is often greater
than the before-tax rate of return on equivalent investments multiplied by one less the
taxpayer's marginal rate, because such yield must be set high enough to attract investors
in lower tax brackets. See, e.g., DODGE, supra note 27, at 295-97. In the § 104 situation,
on the other hand, the implicit tax would be keyed to the plaintiff's actual marginal rate.
Moreover, waiver of § 265(a)(2) in the § 103 context would have serious consequences
for the integrity of the tax base, since without § 265(a)(2) the tax base would be readily
eroded as people borrowed on a massive scale to purchase tax-free investments. In con-
trast, the § 104 transaction is involuntary and discrete; there would be no massive ero-
sion of the tax base if attorneys' fees to obtain personal injury recoveries were
deductible.
131 Thus, § 265 has been held to apply to various types of nonabusive transactions.
E.g., National Engraving Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 178 (1944) (expenses of obtaining
excludible life insurance proceeds); Davis v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 503 (1982) (legal
fees to obtain tax-free inheritance). Any deduction for legal fees in the § 104 situation
would have to be obtained through legislation.
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vestment in the qualified annuity) as the "gross recovery"
attributable to loss of earning capacity. Thus, the taxpayer would be
able to obtain an exclusion for the full gross damages recovery if she
can fund the requisite annuity from other sources (including puni-
tive and pain and suffering damages). For example, if X receives a
lump-sum recovery of $1 million gross (all for lost earning capacity)
and pays $400,000 of attorneys' fees, investing $600,000 in the req-
uisite annuity and Scenario (3) applies, the exclusion would be in-
creased for each dollar invested in the annunity, provided that the
total exclusion.would not exceed $1 million. In short, the taxpayer
would be able to invest tax-free in her own human-capital replace-
ment to the extent of attorneys' fees. 13 2 The effect of this rule is to
deem certain amounts to be tax-free recoveries of legal fees. So
viewed, the fees themselves clearly cannot be deducted. 133
C. Other Policies Bearing on Section 104
1. Federalism Issues Pertaining to Section 104
The government might decide to repeal section 104 simply to
uncover a new source of revenue. Repeal of all section 104 exclu-
sions would mean that tort law could achieve plaintiff equity only by
adopting damage-computation Scenarios (5) and (6):
(5) Lump-sum recovery computed before taxes, reduced to pres-
ent value using an after-tax discount rate; and
(6) Annuity recovery computed before taxes.
Only under Scenarios (5) and (6) will the federal government obtain
the same revenue, $90,000, from the plaintiff as it would have ob-
tained had the personal injury not occurred. Under Scenarios (5)
and (6) the federal government becomes, in effect, a coplaintiff.
The government, however, is not generally considered to have
a claim against private parties on account of action, even unlawful
action, that deprives the government of future revenues. On the
doctrinal level, parties who were not personally injured cannot re-
cover in tort for their economic losses.1 34 A fortiori, the govern-
ment cannot claim lost revenues against a defendant who inflicted
132 A more difficult question arises when the gross recovery is diminished by the
application (or threat thereof) of a comparative fault rule. Here outside funds could be
invested to "make up the difference" with respect to lost human capital only if the lost
human capital can be objectively ascertained. Making such a determination may be re-
quired in the tax proceeding itself. To prevent abuse, this proceeding would have to be
more adversarial than simply filling out a schedule on a tax return.
133 Otherwise exactly the same dollars will be both excluded and deducted. For an-
other illustration, see infra note 182.
134 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Louisiana ex reL
Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S.
903 (1986).
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personal injuries on private parties. At the jurisprudential level, pri-
vate parties owe no duty to the government to prevent erosion of
the revenue base. Such a duty, contrary to American political cul-
ture, would have to be based on the subservience of private eco-
nomic activity to government ends. Moreover, in policy terms, if the
"deadweight" losses associated with destruction of earning capacity
are shouldered entirely by the private sector, and not at all by gov-
ernment in the form of reduced taxes, improvement of aggregate
social welfare would be unlikely.
Ultimately, tort law might not, and perhaps should not, be
modified to conform to Scenarios (5) and (6) in response to a repeal
of section 104.135 Because these Scenarios impose a higher burden
on defendants than the others, lawmakers may be persuaded that
their adoption, although achieving equity for plaintiffs, is bad policy
or politics on account of overburdening defendants. At the same
time, existing section 104 pressures states to compute damages on
an after-tax basis if they desire to avoid overcompensating plaintiffs,
with the incidental effect of possibly underpenalizing defendants, as
illustrated in Table 1.136 Either retention or repeal of existing sec-
tion 104, therefore, constitutes federal involvement in state remedy
policy. Of course, the involvement is only indirect because the
states can proceed to systematically over- or undercompensate
plaintiffs and over- or underpenalize defendants at will. No persua-
sive reason exists, however, for states to view section 104 as being
intended to produce overcompensation of plaintiffs.' 3 7
An intermediate possibility is retention of the basic section 104
exclusion but repeal of the "structured settlement" exclusion. If
135 Sie supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text discussing alternate scenarios.
136 See infra Part II.B; see also Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490,
493-98 (1980) (FELA case); Floyd v. Fruit Indus., Inc., 136 A.2d 918 (Conn. 1957);
Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa 1969); see generally Bradford, supra note 97, at
220-24 (discussing Liepelt).
137 See supra notes 32, 38. Whether states should overcompensate plaintiffs in other
contexts or for reasons independent of § 104 is an issue that need not be addressed
here. Overcompensation of plaintiffs results, for example, from the "collateral source
rule," under which courts refuse to reduce a tortfeasor's obligation simply because the
plaintiff receives compensation from third parties, typically by way of insurance. RE-
STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 920A(2) (1977). However, the collateral source rule is
distinguishable from the situation arising under § 104. Any § 104 tax benefit is not
-compensatory" nor, if considered a "collateral source," would it come close to defeat-
ing a tortfeasor's obligation to pay damages. Deterrence policy mandates that
tortfeasors not be allowed to shirk responsibility arising from tortious conduct on ac-
count of the fortuitous circumstance of third-party compensation. At the same time, the
right to insurance proceeds, unlike the benefits obtainable under § 104, is a matter of
contract which thc insurer should not be able to avoid simply because the tortfeasor is
fully liable. See also Bradford, supra note 97, at 216-19 (arguing that § 104 does not
require states to compute damages on a before-tax basis thereby producing excess re-
coveries for plaintiffs; therefore, § 104 is not a true collateral source).
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plaintiff equity were the goal, this move would rule out Scenarios
(2A), (3), and possibly (1),138 leaving only Scenario (4), which
arguably underdeters defendants, especially if the payments are
deductible.
Only a federal tax regime modelled on Table 2 can guarantee
equitable and truly "compensatory" results for plaintiffs while al-
lowing lawmakers to pursue varying deterrence policies. States have
generally failed, whether by oversight or by design, to strive for
plaintiff equity in the context of the existing version of section 104.
Consequently, one cannot assume that states will do a better job if
section 104 is repealed or modified. Indeed, states that currently
compute damages on a before-tax basis might err by telling juries
that the damages are taxable, 3 9 thereby inducing the juries to in-
crease the recovery by the amount of the taxes that will be due. 140
As indicated by Scenarios (5) and (6), however, computing damages
on a before-tax basis is already compatible with fully taxing the re-
covery. If before-tax recoveries are increased by the taxes them-
selves, both plaintiffs and the government are overcompensated and
defendants would probably be required to pay more than would be
necessary to deter them.
In short, retention or repeal of section 104, or even repeal of
the structured-settlement aspect of section 104, would invite states
to "buy into" plaintiff equity at the "cost" of committing itself to a
particular deterrence regime-a regime that may not coincide with
its informed policy judgment. The state may decline the invitation,
and subordinate plaintiff equity concerns to its view either of a
proper deterrence policy or its inclination to overcompensate plain-
tiffs for other reasons. If the federal government has itself "solved"
the deterrence issue, perhaps federal tort legislation should be en-
acted. Otherwise, the states should be free to experiment with de-
terrence policies. This can be achieved, without sacrificing plaintiff
138 See infra Table 2.
139 The prevailing rule is that juries should not take taxes into account. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A(1) (1977). See Estate of Spinosa, 621 F.2d 1154, 1158-
59 (1st Cir. 1980) (majority rule is that taxes cannot be considered in calculating dam-
ages). See generally Theuman, supra note 89. This rule, however, only produces the right
result when damages are "correctly" computed with reference to existing tax rules. In
that case,juries can be told, "Don't worry about taxes, they have already been taken into
account in the formula for computing damages." See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v.
Liepett, 444 U.S. 490 (1980) (jury can be informed that damages were tax-free, so long
as damages were computed on after-tax basis). See generally RobertJ. Nordstrom, Income
Taxes and Personal Injury Awards, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 212 (1958); Robert H. Feldman, Personal
Injury Awards: Should Tax-Exempt Status Be Ignored?, 7 ARIz. L. REv. 272 (1966) (both arti-
cles arguing that juries should be told that damages are tax-exempt in order to prevent
them from overcompensating plaintiffs).
140 For example, referring to Table 2, if the plaintiff's tax rate is 30%, the jury might
award $374,901 ($262,431 under Scenario (5) divided by 0.7).
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equity, by adopting an "adaptive" version of section 104 along the
lines set forth in Table 2. The present system implicitly embodies a
vaguely formulated federal tort policy, but it lacks any explicit ra-
tionale or force.
2. Deterrence Policy
The principal object of tort law on the defendant side is to ade-
quately deter undesirable behavior without excessively discouraging
desirable or neutral behavior. 14 ' Because personal injuries entail
the destruction of human capital, rather than its appropriation by
the defendant, it is logically unnecessary to penalize the defendant
to the same degree that the plaintiff is compensated, as would be
proper in a rescission or unjust enrichment situation. 142
Some asymmetry between plaintiff recoveries and defendant
payments inevitably arises because of the existing tax system, since
the tax treatment of plaintiffs is not tied to that of defendants, nor
vice versa.' 43 Nonetheless, if the marginal rates of plaintiffs and de-
fendants are the same, the amount paid by defendants, net of taxes,
will equal the amount received by plaintiffs, net of taxes, only under
Scenarios (5) and (6) (complete repeal of section 104), 144 but only if
payments are deductible by defendants.' 45 When the payments are
not deductible, because the tort claim did not arise out of the defen-
dant's business or investment activities, 146 the defendant will suffer
more than the plaintiff gains under Scenarios (5) and (6). Under
Scenario (1) (exclusion for annuity payments) and Scenario (4) (ex-
clusion for lump-sum recovery only) the net recovery and the net
payment are equal when the payments are nondeductible. Under
141 Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1977) (citing both deterrence and
punishment). However, the punishment idea is carried out through the concept of puni-
tive damages. Id § 908 (citing deterrence as secondary goal). Neither "punishment"
nor "deterrence" implies a corresponding reward to the plaintiff, except perhaps to in-
duce potential plaintiffs to bring suits to vindicate society's interests. The tax treatment
of punitive damages is discussed infra at notes 175-82.
142 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901, cmts. a, c (1977). For example, the
collateral source rule is accepted in order to impose a proper level of deterrence on
defendants, even though the effect of the rule is to overcompensate plaintiffs.
143 See supra note 30. In addition, plaintiffs and defendants may be in different mar-
ginal rate brackets.
144 If a payment of $262,431 is deductible and the payor is in the 30% rate bracket,
the net payment is $183,702. The net payment with respect to a series of three
$100,000 payments is $210,000, the present value of which is $183,702. Under
§ 461(h)(2)(C), an accrual-method taxpayer can only deduct tort and workers-compen-
sation liabilities when paid; otherwise, the net payment would only be $158,685
($248,685, the present value of $300,000 future payments, less $90,000, the tax savings
derived from an immediate deduction of 300,000).
145 The deduction can be for direct payments to plaintiffs or, for indirect payments,
such as liability insurance premiums.
146 See supra note 18.
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Scenario (3) (exclusion for both lump-sum recovery and annuity
payments), the defendant always pays less, net, than the plaintiff re-
ceives. Under Scenario (2A) (inclusion of lump-sum recovery and
exclusion of annuity payments), the defendant is in a better position
than the plaintiff, net, if the payment is deductible; otherwise, the
defendant is worse off-but the twain shall never meet. 147 These
results are summarized in Table 3, which assumes a 30% tax rate on
plaintiffs and defendants:
TABLE 3: AFTER-TAX BURDENS ON DEFENDANTS
(reduced, in Scenarios (1) and (6), to present value at a 7% discount rate)
Scenarios (1) (2A) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Plaintiff nets 183,702 183,702 183,702 183,702 183,702 183,702
Defendant's net payment:
deductible 121,856 174,080 121,856 128,591 183,702 183,702
nondeductible 183,702 248,685 174,080 183,702 262,431 262,431
Deterrence policy is instrumental, and not driven by ethical
considerations. The idea of general deterrence is inherently unfair:
certain wrongdoers, even if equally "guilty" as others, may be sin-
gled out as examples for sanctions in order to induce modified con-
duct.'4 Even if fairness among tort defendants were a desirable
policy goal, it probably could ,not be implemented by damage
awards, because particular wrongdoers can shift their burdens, in
whole or in part, through insurance, and because awards of punitive
and pain and suffering damages are largely rendered without regard
to objective standards.' 49 There is no a priori reason for tax policy
to attempt to mold tort policy in the direction of insuring that the
net loss imposed upon a particular defendant will equal exactly the
amount received by the plaintiff. If, from the torts perspective, it is
deemed desirable that defendants who cause equal harm end up in
the same position after taxes, then it is up to tort law to adapt to tax
law, not vice versa.
However, an economic argument supports tying the net burden
on defendants to the compensation received by plaintiffs. In eco-
nomic theory, the social cost of torts will exceed the marginal busi-
147 This is true unless the defendant is subject to a 26.13% rate, and the payment is
deductible, while the plaintiff is subject to a 30%y rate.
148 In this discussion, I am referring to the idea of general deterrence, making an
example out of one member of a class, and not to the idea of specific deterrence, influ-
encing one party's behavior by acting directly against that party.
149 The standards that do exist in a few states typically involve a loose nexus be-
tween punitive and compensatory damages. However, a "cap" on punitive damages is
not really a "standard." See statutes collected in Johnston, supra note 17, at 1388 n.10;
see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977) (Jury "can properly consider
the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff
that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.").
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ness revenue from tort-risking activities unless these costs are
"internalized" and made a marginal cost of business.' 50 The social
costs can be internalized only if defendants, and indirectly, their
customers, are made to bear the full social costs after taxes. This
aim can be most closely achieved under Scenarios (5) and (6).15'
Adopting this approach would suggest that Scenarios (1) through
(4) under-penalize business defendants. The fact that Scenarios (1)
and (4) appear to achieve the right result when the payment is non-
deductible, is relevant only to business which is untaxed. There-
fore, retention of section 104 in its present form brings about the
right degree of internalization of social costs only by accident.
Arguably, retention of section 104 could be accommodated to
"internalization" by disallowing any deduction for compensatory
personal-injury damages. Even then, however, the deterrence level
would be theoretically "wrong" under Scenarios (2A) and (3). More
importantly, no economic or tax justification exists for singling out
this one particular category of business-related cost for disallow-
ance. Federal tax law disallows deductions on a public policy basis
only in aggravating circumstances, which are not present here. 52
Further, any federal policy of penalizing defendants by disallowing
deductions could be subverted by a state rule calculating damages
on an after-tax basis using a before-tax discount rate, as exemplified
in Scenario (3).153
Although economic theory suggests repeal of section 104 and a
move to Scenarios (5) and (6), with or without deductibility, ulti-
mately the proper level of deterrence is an empirical, or even polit-
ical, question. For example, a certain level of deterrence might well
exist independently of tort law by reason of criminal law, govern-
ment regulation (or the fear thereof), the possibility of injuring one-
self, moral standards, business judgment, and so on. On the other
hand, purely economic injuries may be undercompensated due to
plaintiffs' failure to file claims, the threat of delay, comparative neg-
150 By internalizing such costs, the defendant must raise its prices for its goods or
services. If customers continue to purchase the goods or services at the higher prices,
then the aggregate welfare gain will at least equal the aggregate welfare loss attributable
to the tortious conduct. Otherwise, the defendant will go out of business, which is the
right economic result when social loss exceeds social gains. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 127-28 (1987); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF
ACCIDENTS 68-73 (1970).
151 SHAVELL, supra note 150, at 143 (damages should be computed on a before-tax
basis in order that defendants will bear total welfare loss).
152 The following deductions are disallowed: illegal payments under § 162(c), fines
and penalties under § 162(f), certain treble damage payments under antitrust la'As in
§ 162(g), and expenses of illegal drug businesses under § 280E.
153 In addition, the government has no economic interest in denying the deduction
to defendants because, if the injuries had not occurred, an employer would have re-
ceived deductions for the wages paid.
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ligence regimes, defenses, countersuits, capriciousness of juries,
other legal obstacles, and insolvency of defendants.1 54 In addition
to these uncertainties, the notion that the proper level of deterrence
can be determined by the operation of the market makes the im-
probable assumption that private parties can, and are willing to, ac-
curately weigh costs and benefits while factoring "risk" into
account.1 55 For these very reasons, some have argued that the link
between compensation policy and deterrence policy should be sev-
ered by moving to a no-fault compensation system, especially in the
context of nonbusiness torts.1 56
Above all, the results set forth in Table 3 only describe the im-
pact on defendants of damages for the destruction of human capital.
Punitive, pain and suffering, and other damages for noneconomic
harms are disregarded, rendering implausible the notion that tort
and tax law should converge to match the defendant's net obliga-
tion, exactly to the plaintiff's net recovery with respect to lost earning
capacity. More broadly, it would be error to assume that tax deduct-
ibility rules pertaining to damages for lost human capital, or any
other component of damages, are the crucial ingredient in deter-
rence policy. Further, it would be dogmatic to insist that only Sce-
narios (5) and (6) pertaining to recoveries for lost earning capacity
provide just the right level of deterrence in practice. 57
It is best, then, to conclude that deterrence policy is beyond the
reach of section 104, meaning that tax rules affecting defendants
should be evaluated strictly from the vantage of tax policy and plain-
tiff-side compensation policy. Since compensation policy has al-
ready been discussed, it only remains to consider tax policy from the
154 See Johnston, supra note 17, at 1385-88 and authorities cited, supra notes 3-6.
155 See CALABRESI, supra note 150, at 73-96. Whether economics can be readily ap-
plied to nonbusiness torts is problematic. Possibly "plaintiff utility" could replace "mar-
ginal business revenue" in the analysis. On the other hand, because utility is subjective
and not converted into any market equivalent, like prices and output, it would seem that
the concept of economic efficiency could not be readily imposed. Also, for an individ-
ual, a rational utility calculation is virtually impossible to make, because the "negative
rate of return," especially in the case of negligence, is a function of risk for which the
"odds" are not likely to be available, much less considered. See id. at 56-57.
156 See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident
Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CAL. L. REV. 898 (1985); Guido Calabresi &
Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test of Strict Liabiltyfor Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972). Eco-
nomic deterrence presupposes that the potential tortfeasor has the capacity and material
incentive to control its harmful acts. Under no-fault regimes, potential tortfeasors have
only the most diffuse economic incentive to avoid harm. For this reason, no-fault sys-
tems make the most sense in a nonbusiness context where noneconomic incentives
would weigh more heavily. Section 104, of course, comes into play under no-fault com-
pensation systems as well as fault systems.
157 See Johnston, supra note 17, at 1390, 1395-98 (arguing that, in a legal system
fraught with uncertainty, the best deterrence system is one that imposes a relatively low
risk of liability but a disproportionately high payment obligation if liability is found).
1992]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
defendant-side, where it- appears that any of the Scenarios create
horizontal inequity between business and nonbusiness defendants.
As noted above, however, one can rule out disallowing deductions
to business defendants, because payment obligations and liability
insurance premiums are appropriate business expenses; in other
words, the "inequity" derives from an inaccurate perception of how
to make the relevant comparison. 158
The alternative way of obtaining defendant "horizontal equity"
would be to repeal section 104, thereby triggering Scenarios (5) and
(6), but to allow nonbusiness tort payments and liability insurance
premiums to be deductible. However, because nonbusiness costs
are generally nondeductible, it is necessary to devise a substantive
theory of why these particular nonbusiness costs should be deducti-
ble. Such a theory would hold that involuntary, or nondiscretion-
ary, expenses should be deductible on ability-to-pay "fairness"
grounds, even if not business- or investment-related.' 59 If this
premise is accepted, then even payments by individual defendants in
a personal capacity should be deductible. Nondiscretionary pay-
ments would be deductible under this approach only if they are ex-
traordinary in amount and kind. Liability insurance premium
payments, though, are normal and relatively small; hence, the case
for deducting them is weak. Still, one may argue by analogy to the
casualty loss situation that self-insured damage payments should be
deductible, even though insurance premiums are not.' 60 And yet,
the casualty loss deduction itself, as well as the proposed deduction
for damage payments, can be viewed as being inappropriate.
Neither personal casualty losses nor damage payments are nondis-
cretionary, or involuntary, to the extent that they could have.been
insured against. Moreover, a rule allowing deductions for damage
payments and casualty losses, while disallowing deductions for in-
surance premiums, provides the wrong incentive structure.' 6 ' Uni-
versal insurance is by far preferable to self-insurance as a means of
158 The business defendant should be compared to other business taxpayers incur-
ring the same costs, not to nonbusiness defendants.
159 The premise would be that the correct "fairness" norm for the tax base is "ability
to pay," rather than the Haig-Simons definition of "income" that refers to "consump-
tion" plus net increases in wealth; the "income" concept itself being a compromise be-
tween fairness and minimal neutrality norms. See DODGE, supra note 27, at 117-29.
160 I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) & (h) (1988 and Supp. 1990). Nonbusiness and noninvest-
ment casualty insurance premiums are nondeductible personal expenses. Id. § 262.
161 The concept of what constitutes "nondiscretionary" losses necessarily has a
strong normative flavor, and is not decided on an individual basis. For example, the tax
system operates on the assumption that people spend certain amounts for subsistence
and medical care, whether or not they actually do so. See Id. §§ 63(c), 63(f), 151(d)(1),
and 213(a) (flat amount standard, self-support, and dependent-support deductions;
medical expenses deductible only in excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income).
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compensating plaintiffs. Large payment obligations are likely to ex-
tend beyond an individual defendant's financial means and, when
they are not, they are dischargeable in bankruptcy. 162 Insurance
may be the best available means of obtaining the right "price" from
consumers for their personal risk-taking activities. All things con-
sidered, the case for a deduction for nonbusiness damages is plausi-
ble but unconvincing. Since the disparate tax treatment of business
and nonbusiness defendants is justified under tax theory, and be-
cause economic theory is inconclusive, such disparate tax treatment
cannot, in itself, lead one to demand its elimination or to prefer any
of the possible alternative solutions to the section 104 problem.
One potential drawback to simple repeal of section 104 can be
identified: state courts may explicitly or implicitly sanction a before-
tax discount rate in figuring recoveries for lost-earning capacity. 163
Scenario (5) produces the right result, using an after-tax discount
rate. Use of a before-tax discount rate in the context of a repealed section 104
imposes a double tax on plaintifs: one implicit, the before-tax discount rate,
and one explicit, the tax on the annuity return. Therefore, Congress
should approach simple repeal of section 104 with extreme caution.
This action should not be undertaken without a clear signal to states
that plaintiff equity can be achieved only by figuring lump-sum dam-
age recoveries on a before-tax basis using an after-tax discount rate.
A virtue of the adaptive model of section 104 presented in
Table 2 is that those states which misguidedly believe that defen-
dant liabilities should match plaintiff lump-sum recoveries with re-
spect to lost earning capacity could allow for a case-by-case election
between Scenarios (4) and (5). For annuity recoveries, states could
allow an election between Scenarios (1) and (6), depending on
whether the damage payments are deductible, directly or indirectly,
by the defendant. Some might object that the adaptive model is al-
ready complicated enough. It is doubtful that states could, or
would, "adapt" to a tax provision that itself was designed to adapt
to state damages rules. Historically, state courts have been reluctant
to take federal tax law into account in fixing damages.' 64 Neverthe-
less, a move to the adaptive model would offer states the opportu-
nity, in general, to choose among various possible deterrence levels,
with or without taking deduction rules into account, without sacrific-
ing the goal of correct compensation for plaintiffs for lost human
capital.
162 11 U.S.C. §'524 (1978).
163 If the discount-rate issue is not addressed, it is likely that a before-tax discount
rate will be employed by default, because "investment talk" usually refers to before-tax
rates. See supra note 90.
164 See Theuman, supra note 89.
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If the adaptive model is not adopted, the federal legislators
must choose between retaining or repealing section 104. Although
a case can be made for repeal, it is unconvincing, especially if one
gives any substantial weight to plaintiff equity concerns. If tort law
should achieve the correct level of plaintiff compensation, it can be
done in the context of section 104. The Liepelt case' 65 and this Arti-
cle provide the requisite analytical tools.
D. What Is a Personal Injury Under Present Section 104?
Given the absence of meaningful legislative history regarding
the scope of section 104, reference should be made to the concept
of human capital in order to determine what constitutes a "per-
sonal," as opposed to "commercial," injury in case of possible over-
lap.166 The problem is best illustrated by the leading case of Roemer
v. Commissioner, ' 67 which involved libel. ' 68 The government claimed
that the recovery was not excludible under section 104 because the
measure of damages was the economic loss to the taxpayer's insur-
ance business proprietorship. The taxpayer successfully argued that
libel was historically and inherently a "personal" action within the
scope of section 104. Though computation of damages by referring
to lost business income does not establish a "business" tort, 169
neither should the history and categories of tort law dictate the re-
sult for federal income tax purposes, 170 especially when relevant cat-
egories of tort and contract law often overlap.17' Of course, tort law
is a "necessary" input as far as understanding the facts, but it does
not follow that it is "sufficient."
The essential distinction, for example, between "business" and
"personal" goodwill, or capital, is that the former is transferable
165 Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980). See supra note 38.
166 See also Brooks, supra note 8, at 791-804 (although reaching somewhat different
conclusions than those reached here).
167 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), reviewing 79 T.C. 398 (1982). But see Rev. Rul. 85-
143, 1985-2 C.B. 55 (disagreeing with Roemer).
168 See also Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct.
47 (1991); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990) (employment discrimi-
nation); Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989), rev'g in part 90 T.C. 1000
(1988) (wrongful discharge); Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989)
(sex discrimination); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (overruling its
own decision in Roemer), aft'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988).
169 Business income can result from the employment of both human and physical
capital, hence, loss of business income can result from loss of either kind of capital.
170 Byrne, 883 F.2d 211 (holding that wrongful discharge claim is more tort-like than
contract-like).
171 For example, the tort of libel can be based on the same lacts as the tort of busi-
ness disparagement. See W.P. KETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 962-65
(5th ed. 1984 & 1988 Supp.).
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and the latter is not.172 Perhaps section 104 cases involving libel
and slander could be decided on the basis of evidence, introduced
in the tax proceeding, as to what an unrelated party would have paid
for business goodwill before and after the injurious conduct. This
portion of the recovery would be for commercial loss, while the re-
mainder would cover personal injury.
An alternative approach, derived from cases limiting the deduc-
tion for business wages to payments of "reasonable compensation,"
would treat future return from a proprietorship or professional
business as salary, to the extent that the taxpayer would have re-
ceived wages in the market from an arms-length employer in a com-
parable situation.1 73 The injured party's wage-earning capacity
could be compared on a before-and-after basis with reference to the
tortious conduct, and that loss would be from a personal injury.
Employment discrimination and civil rights deprivation cases
are apparently more complex, because it is often difficult to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff has really lost human capital: the plaintiff
can recover for lost past and future wages even if she ends up with a
higher-payingjob. Insofar as damages in these cases are awarded to
deter or punish defendants, no more reason exists to exclude them
from income than exists to exclude punitive damages. 174 On the
other hand, these and other cases do not usually involve the distinc-
tion between personal and commercial injury, because a "business"
apart from the person and her employment is not typically present.
Furthermore, present section 104 mandates the exclusion not only
of damages for lost earning capacity, but also for "noneconomic
personal injury," such as humiliation, fear, and embarrassment.
The fact that damages for noneconomic injuries may possess a de-
terrent or retributive function does not negate the fact that these
same damages are supposed to "compensate" for noneconomic
harm. Therefore, under current section 104, damages for personal
torts should be fully excluded from gross income to the extent that
they are not readily identifiable as punitive damages.
172 See Bateman v. United States, 490 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1973) (issue was whether
the goodwill in question was a partnership asset or a personal attribute of one of the
partners). .
173 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1990). See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-8, 1979-1 G.B. 92.
174 For a discussion of punitive damages under current law, see supra note 4. For a
policy discussion of punitive damages, see infra text accompanying notes 175-82.
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II
PERSONAL INJURY RECOVERIES OTHER THAN
FOR HUMAN CAPITAL
This Part discusses the policy issue of whether punitive dam-
ages and "noneconomic" damages, encompassing both pain-and-
suffering damages in physical-injury cases and nonphysical,
noneconomic torts, should be excludible from income.
A. Punitive Damages
As a matter of policy, there is little doubt that punitive damages
should be included in gross income. Such damages represent an
economic windfall, and do not compensate for any loss whatsoever.
Punitive damages represent a pure accretion to wealth. 75
One argument advanced in favor of excluding punitive dam-
ages is that the exclusion might compensate the plaintiff for legal
fees and other expenses, and thereby truly make the plaintiff whole.
However, punitive damages have no relation, under tort law, to
legal fees. 176 The argument for exciudibility would be better di-
rected toward reforming tort law to award legal fees to plaintiffs and
to create standards for punitive damages. No justification exists for
excluding punitive damages in excess of legal fees.
The only other plausible argument for excluding punitive
damages is that their inclusion, while retaining exclusions for com-
pensatory damages, would create an administrative problem of dis-
tinguishing includible from excludible damages, especially when the
case was settled or went to judgment without specification of the
punitive damages amount. However, one could also advance this
argument in favor of the proposition that compensatory damages
should be included in gross income. An allocation by the parties
should not control, because their "tax" interests are not necessarily
opposed. 77 Nor should the plaintiff's allocation of damages in the
complaint control, 178 because tax law should not unnecessarily dic-
175 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), reh'g denied, 349 U.S.
925 (1955) (punitive damages in commercial torts are fully includible). See Brooks, supra
note 8, at 785-86; Section of Taxation, American Bar Ass'n, Comments Concerning Sec-
tion 11641 of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 Amending Section 104(a)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code, reprinted in TAx ANALYSTS DAILY HIGHLIGHTS & DOCUMENTS
1505-08 (Nov. 9, 1989).
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e (1977) (barest hint that expenses
of bringing suit may be considered in awarding punitive damages). See supra note 149.
177 The defendant's payment of damages is deductible whether the damages are
compensatory or punitive. Even if punitive damages were categorically nondeductible,
one would not expect a settlement to accurately embody a proper allocation when the
parties are subject to different tax rates.
178 If better evidence of a proper allocation cannot be found, the IRS looks to the
complaint. Rev. Rul. 58-418. 1958-2 C.W 18.
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tate the behavior of personal-injury lawyers. With no external refer-
ence, such as a judicial decree or findings, the allocation must be
made on the basis of an independent "tax" examination of the cause
of action.
The proposed revision of section 104 along "adaptive" lines, as
illustrated by Table 2, already accommodates these arguments, be-
cause any exclusion for a lump sum is limited to the lesser of (1) the
gross loss, before legal fees, of human capital and (2) the amount re-
invested in a qualified annuity. The person receiving the recovery
can show the gross loss of human capital in the tax proceeding,
without being bound by the tort proceeding, though the latter may
be heavily weighed if it proceeds to judgment, on the basis of the
usual kinds of evidence. 179 All damages, including punitive dam-
ages, would be available for investment in the qualifying annuity.
Thus, punitive damages would, in effect, be potentially excludible in
an amount equal to the attorneys' fees allocable to the compensa-
tory damages. 18 0 Alternatively, no allocation problem would exist
in those cases where lump-sum compensatory damages are includ-
able in gross income. This approach also moots the possibility of
allowing a full deduction for legal fees. 181 Legal fees would be
treated the same as under conventional tax doctrine. 182
179 Actually, recoveries would be allocated first to medical expenses and other out-
of-pocket costs. Rev. Rul. 75-230, 1975-1 C.B. 93. Evidence of lost earning capacity
would relate to current wages, expected period of future employment, and possibly
prospects for future merit raises and promotions. Of course, a discount rate also needs
to be selected. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 912 cmt. d, 913A (1977). It is
doubtful that any account should be taken of future inflation because (1) future inflation
is taken into account in prevailing discount rates and (2) no reason exists to assume that
wages do not generally adjust to inflation. The recovering plaintiff would adversely suf-
fer only if "locked into" an annuity investment with a fixed rate of return. Variable
annuities, however, are available in the market. For this reason, the plaintiff might well
prefer a lump-sum recovery rather than an annuity obligation of the defendant or in-
surer. Certainly tax law should not favor the latter over the former. Of course, some
market risk is unavoidable.
180 For example, assume a judgment returns $600,000 in damages for lost earning
capacity plus $400,000 in punitive damages, and that legal fees and other expenses are
$300,000. Assuming that the lump sum would qualify for an exclusion in one of the
Scenarios presented in Table 2, $600,000 would be excluded if $600,000 were rein-
vested in a qualified annuity.
181 See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text.
182 An otherwise deductible expense is disallowed under § 265 if it triggers a tax-
free reimbursement. To illustrate, assume the same facts as discussed supra in note 180.
Under normal allocation principles, the $300,000 attorneys' fees would be allocated as
follows: $180,000, or 60%, to the compensatory damages, and $120,000, or 40%, to
the punitive damages. This allocation would hold if the exclusion were in fact $600,000,
because that amount is invested in a qualified annuity. The $180,000 would be disal-
lowed and the other $120,000 would be deductible. If only $500,000 were invested in a
qualified annuity, the allocation of attorneys' fees would be on a 50-50 basis. See Rev.
Rul. 58-418, 1958-2 C.B. 18. Cf United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) (certain
legal fees in divorce action are not deductible).
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B. Recoveries for Noneconomic Harms
Section 104 currently excludes damages for pain and suffering,
as well as for purely personal injuries, such as loss of privacy, loss of
consortium, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and depriva-
tion of rights.183 Conceptually, the damages represent a conversion
of some nonmaterial benefit, such as lost "normality," peace of
mind, or dignity, into cash. This is not a situation in which an exclu-
sion could be justified as maintaining the tax status quo with respect
to income from human capital. Since no "basis" exists in any recov-
ery of this type, such damages seemingly should be fully includible
as pure accessions to material wealth. The burden of persuasion in
the policy sense lies with the proponents of exclusion.
Some argue that these damages should not be taxed because
they are a substitute for goods of a nontaxable nature, such as plea-
sure, pain, or normalcy.18 4 However, the "substitute for" analysis is
not a policy tool. Rather, it is a doctrinal device employed to ascer-
tain the substance of a receipt in order to determine which statutory
category to apply. 185 Moreover, in the doctrinal context, the "sub-
stitute for" analysis has limits, 186 which have been imposed in the
very area under scrutiny, section 104.187
If one were to apply this doctrinal device to the policy arena, it
would lead nowhere, because damages for noneconomic harm are
not a "substitute for" any other kind of receipt that has tax signifi-
cance. They are simply damages for noneconomic harm. Nonpecu-
niary damages are not computed with reference to foregone
consumption which would have been purchased in the market. If
they were so computed, computing foregone consumption on an
183 Rev. Rul. 74-77, 1974-1 C.B. 33, superseding Solicitor's Opinion 132, 1-1 C.B. 92
(1922).
184 See Brooks, supra note 8, at 763-73. See also United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299,
311 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting difficulty of applying concept to recov-
eries for assets with no basis).
185 E.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 964
(1958) (purported "sale" of production payment is really acceleration of ordinary gross
income; however, the better analysis would have been to treat the transaction as a
"loan"); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941) (lease cancellation payment is really
"rent," not "amount realized" in "sale"); Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63 (property
received in-kind by ex-wife on divorce is excluded, with basis equal to value, presumably
because property is acceleration of inheritance or, possibly, support, both of which are
"permanently" tax-free).
186 See, e.g., Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944) (commercial damages measured by lost future profits are not
"substitute for" such profits but are "amount realized" on involuntary conversion of
business goodwill).
187 See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983), reviewing 79 T.C. 398
(1982) (defamation damages measured by lost business profits are really for involuntary
conversion of human capital).
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after-tax basis would subject the taxpayer to an implioit tax that
would be preserved by an exclusion. 88 In fact, pain-and-suffering
damages compensate that which cannot be purchased. Thus, it is
fundamentally misleading to call these damages "compensation";
they "replace" the irreplaceable.
A variation of the "substitute for" argument is that recoveries
for noneconomic harms are mere restorations of a status quo which,
in itself, would have been nontaxable as imputed income.189 Ap-
peals to imputed income, however, are fruitless, because imputed
income, by definition, refers to economic benefits that have not
been converted to cash or property. In contrast, noneconomic dam-
ages result from a conversion to cash. It is also misleading to con-
sider imputed income as nontaxable in the sense of being
"excluded"; rather, it is simply ignored. The difference lies in the
fact that excluded items are capable of creating a basis.' 90 To argue
that conversions of imputed income to cash should be excluded is
essentially the same as arguing that wages, which involve a conver-
sion of leisure to labor, should be excluded. This argument actually
cuts in favor of includibility; noneconomic damages are like wages
for a miserable job.
One could argue that damages for noneconomic harms should
not be taxed because the recovery merely replaces a loss of intangi-
ble benefits. This argument is equivalent to stating that wages are
not income because they do not result in "gain," the laborer having
"given up" leisure and other psychic goods to obtain wages.' 9' Of
course, wages are the result of voluntary transactions, whereas pain-
and-suffering damages are not. The question squarely raised, then,
is whether the involuntariness of the transaction justifies not taxing
the accession to wealth. 192 One could argue for no taxation by anal-
ogy to the argument for taxing recovery of lost earning capacity like
wages rather than like investments. 93 Involuntariness may be a le-
gitimate rationale for deferral of income or perhaps deductibility of
188 This analysis answers the practical argument that, if damages for lost earning
capacity are received in a lump sum and are consumed, rather than being invested, the
effect is exactly the same as that achieved by an exclusion for pain-and-suffering dam-
ages. Therefore, the two might as well be treated identically. However, recoveries for
lost earning capacity, unlike pain-and-suffering damages, can be computed with refer-
ence to lost future wages on an after-tax basis.
189 Brooks, supra note 8, at 769-73.
190 See I.R.C. § 1014 (bequests and inheritances); Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63.
The carryover basis rule for gifts, § 1015, exists simply to prevent massive tax avoid-
ance. See Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929).
191 Taking this position on one's tax return is likely to bring about a criminal fraud
prosecution. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, Ill S. Ct. 604 (1991).
192 As a matter of positive law, involuntariness is a prerequisite to application of
§ 104. Starrels v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1962).
193 See supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
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outlay, 194 but not for total and permanent exclusion of a clearly-
realized accession to wealth. 195
One could also argue that the difference between taxing some-
thing once instead of twice (as section 104 accomplishes for recov-
eries for lost human capital) parallels the exclusion of something
entirely rather than the taxation of it once. 196 Mathematically, this is
nonsense; proportionality would be achieved by excluding only half
of the pain-and-suffering damages. In addition, the statement that
investment income is taxed twice is only true in present value
terms 197 and only under a "correct" capital recovery system. 198
Similarly, it is inaccurate to say that wage income is only taxed once,
because both "human-capital" capital expenditures and accessions
are ignored. 199 Thus, the relationship of wage income to invest-
ment income cannot be reduced to a constant ratio. Though the
differences are significant, the ultimate burden on wage and invest-
ment income is not so radically different as to justify, by inference, a
total exclusion for pain-and-suffering damages.
A less metaphysical, but more plausible, argument for exclud-
ing noneconomic recoveries is simply that the transaction, as a
whole, represents a net decrease in the taxpayer's "utility." That is,
the plaintiff would be in a worse, not better, position if the recovery
for nonpecuniary loss were taxed. Even working in an awful job
presumably entails some increase in taxpayer utility; otherwise the
employment would not have been undertaken. People do not risk
life and limb in the hope of obtaining noneconomic damage recov-
eries, presumably because such transactions are acknowledged to be
"losers" or, at least too risky.200
194 See supra notes 102-06, 159-62 and accompanying text.
195 Some employee fringe benefits are excluded (e.g., I.R.C. §§ 79, 105, 106, 127,
and 132), and the rest are taxed (I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)). The ones excluded, however, in-
clude many benefits that a person would ordinarily purchase voluntarily, such as health
care and life insurance up to $50,000.
196 The nonpecuniary recovery could be subjected to tax "once" if it were required
to be invested in an annuity, in which case the annuity income would be taxed. But
nonpecuniary recoveries are not categorically intended to replace future streams of in-
come, or utility. Thus, a reinvestment requirement here would be gratuitous.
197 See supra note 100.
198 Accelerated writeoffs have the effect of exempting all or some of the income
from tax. See, e.g., DODGE, supra note 27, at 238-52.
199 For example, educational expenses are nondeductible, except when they main-
tain or improve the taxpayer's existing business. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967). Nonde-
ductible "human-capital" capital expenditures produce no depreciation or loss
deductions, even though human capital is a wasting asset.
200 For purposes of this analysis, it is irrelevant that laborers sometimes make bad
bargains or that tort victims sometimes end up with good ones. Tax rules cannot be
tailored to subjective differences amotig individuals.
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One reason for taxing transactions which generate a utility gain
is that the tax, if designed properly, will not unduly inhibit socially
desirable activity.20' It does not follow, however, that involuntary
transactions should be exempt from tax. Taxing plaintiffs on
noneconomic damages will, if anything, increase deterrence and net
social utility, especially if courts and juries shift plaintiff taxes to
defendants.
The no-utility-gain argument raises the fundamental issue of
the role of "utility" in taxation. Utility in taxation must be distin-
guished from utility in social welfare. Progressive rates in taxation,
for example, have been justified on the theory that sacrificing dol-
lars is less burdensome, in utility terms, on the rich than it is on the
poor.20 2 Similarly, thie desirability of excluding employee fringe
benefits can be questioned on economic efficiency grounds. Exclud-
ing nonpecuniary damage recoveries has the effect of enriching per-
sonal injury plaintiffs relative to taxpayers gemerally. This kind of
subsidy is subject to classic "tax expenditure" analysis, 203 but appar-
ently no welfare economist has undertaken to justify a discrete
subsidy to plaintiffs receiving noneconomic damages. 20 4 Any "eco-
nomic incentive" justification for the exclusion is totally implausi-
ble. A social welfare claim based, at most, on a "hunch" is not a
persuasive justification for this aspect of the section 104 exclusion.
Finally, the tax rule for nonpecuniary loss recoveries does not ulti-
mately solve the social welfare equation. Even if such recoveries are
taxed to plaintiffs, the legal (tort) system can compensate plaintiffs
for the incremental tax burden by shifting it to defendants.
We are left with the question of whether the core concept of
"income" is ultimately tied to that of "utility." In practice, and ig-
noring "tax expenditure" provisions, the concept of income is not
systematically tied to subjective utility, as opposed to changes in ob-
jective net wealth. Imputed income from consumer durables, as
well as the value of self-provided services and leisure, is ignored.
Income is taxed to the person who earns and controls it, not the
person who enjoys it.205 Amounts includible are measured by mar-
201 See Lane, supra note 25, at 31-32, 45-46.
202 See HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938); WALTER BLUM & HARRY
KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAxATION (1953).
203 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
204 I am unaware of any such studies.
205 E.g., I.R.C. §§ 101(a), 102(a) and 262 (gifts, bequests, and life insurance pro-
ceeds); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (income from property); Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (same); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill (1930) (services in-
come); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917) (support payments). But see Centex Homes
v. Director, 10 NJ. Tax 473 (N.J. Tax Ct. 1989).
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ket transactions, not subjective worth.20 6 Deductions, like medical
expenses and casualty loss, can be rationalized on a non-utility ba-
sis. 20 7 Other deductions, such as those for charitable contributions
and taxes, are allowed despite substantial utility to the taxpayer. 208
It is not obvious that the income tax base, as opposed to govern-
ment policy in general, should be tied to utility in any normative
sense, 20 9 though influential commentators operating out of the tra-
dition of Utilitarian welfare economics have made the connec-
tion.2 10 Though government policy may rely on utility analysis, and
although virtually all items considered to be gross income poten-
tially yield utility to the taxpayer (or to the taxpayer's family and
friends), it does not logically follow that the tax base should be
equated with utility. The tax base should be equated with material
resources that can be appropriated by government for redistributive
purposes, or, perhaps, with material resources that represent a
claim against society's store of scarce resources. 211 These concepts
of the tax base are objective in principle, not merely as an expedient.
Government, which is supported mostly by taxes, has no interest in
appropriating utility directly from taxpayers. Utility is subjective;
that is, the utility "curves" of various individuals differ. Therefore,
206 Turner v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 462 (1954) only holds that when
property is received "involuntarily" and is not transferable, the amount includible is
wholesale value, not retail value. It is doubtful that Turner states any general rule. See,
e.g., I.R.C. § 83(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b) (1989) (retail market value controls).
207 Essentially, basic subsistence and maintenance expenses are deductible because
minimal private welfare has priority over any obligation to contribute to government
(and, therefore, to the welfare of others). See DODGE, supra note 27, at 117-29; 3 REPORT
OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION 1-24 (1966) (Canada). The casualty loss de-
duction may be wrong under an "income" tax; alternatively, the deduction can be
viewed as a deduction for duplicative (involuntary) consumption expenditures, as op-
posed to consumption foregone. See DODGE, supra note 27, at 124-25.
208 Utility plays a marginal role in distinguishing "personal" from "business" ex-
penses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b)(9) (1972) (personal pleasure is one factor in deter-
mining whether activity is "not for profit"); Moss v. Commissioner, 758 F.2d 211 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 979 (1985) (meal expenses). "Forced" consumption in-kind is
sometimes said to raise the issue of whether the consumption fits the "dominion and
control" aspect of the gross income definition. See Sibla v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d
1260 (9th Cir. 1980). This argument, which is tenuous already, certainly fails when the
employer pays a cash allowance to the taxpayer. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77
(1977).
209 See Thomas Chancellor, Imputed Income and the Ideal Income Tax, 67 OR. L. REV. 561
(1988). Elsewhere, I have expressed preference for an objective "ability to pay" concept
of the tax base, as opposed to the Haig-Simons definition with its emphasis on "con-
sumption." DODGE, supra note 27, at 85-105.
210 ROBERT M. HAIG, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 2-7 (1921); SIMONS, supra note 202,
at 49-50. A recent elaboration on this view is found in Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost
Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L.
REV. 215, 222 (1990) (ultimately conceding that objective values must be the basis of
income taxation on practical grounds-.
211 See DODGE, supra note 27, at 91-94-
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the government cannot transfer utility;2 12 it can only deal in money
and property. Finally, as a normative concept, "income" is ren-
dered much weaker by burdening it with goals that are unobtainable
for practical or political reasons. 213
A huge practical advantage would result from eliminating the
exclusion for noneconomic damages. In the absence of a "special
verdict" that clearly allocates damages among the relevant catego-
ries, the line to be drawn would be between possibly excludible
human-capital damages and all other includible damages, not be-
tween includible punitive damages and all other excludible dam-
ages. 21 4 It is easier to draw the line around human-capital damages
because these losses can be determined objectively and, if neces-
sary, in the tax proceeding, thereby avoiding having to plumb the
psyches of judges, juries, and the parties. Indeed, if human-capital
recoveries are also includible, as under Scenarios (5) and (6), no
need would exist to draw any bright lines. Morenver, under the pro-
posed revision of section 104, recoveries would be deemed to per-
tain first to human-capital losses to the extent thereof; recoveries
would not have to be prorated in any way.
C. Wrongful Death Recoveries
Recoveries that accelerate tax-free receipts of money or prop-
erty are prima facie candidates for exclusion.21 5 The best examples
are wrongful death actions, where the recovery is for the lost tax-
free support, gifts, and inheritance, which would have derived from
the decedent's human capital.216 However, the amount of such sup-
port actually received would have been "after-tax" amounts; that is,
such sums would have been reduced by the decedent's own income
taxes before given to the recipients. Therefore, wrongful death re-
coveries should be treated like recoveries for other personal
injuries.
212 These arguments are developed at greater length in Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v.
Commissioner: Musings About Debt Cancellations and 'Consumption' in an Income Tav Base. 45
TAX L. REv. 677, 692-96 (1991).
213 See Chancellor, supra note 209, at 561-66, 580.
214 Recoveries for medical expenses can be identified easily under the rule that dam-
ages are deemed to compensate first for such expenses. Rev. Rul. 75-230, 1975-1 C.B.
83.
215 Rev. Rul. 67-211, 1967-2 C.B. 63 (wife realizes no income or gain in property
settlement incident to a divorce in which she gives up inheritance and support rights).
Section 1041 dilutes this result by giving the wife only a carryover basis in the property.
216 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 cmts. a & b (1977). The IRS was
correct in its holding in Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, that an Alabama wrongful
death recovery was excludible under § 104, notwithstanding its characterization under
Rev. Rul. 58-578, 1958-2 C.B. 38.
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If the survivor of a deceased plaintiff succeeds to the plaintiff's
cause of action, any recovery by the survivor should not be treated
as a tax-free bequest or inheritance. Instead, the recovery should be
treated as "income in respect of a decedent," meaning that the sur-
vivor would step into the decedent's shoes for tax purposes. 217
CONCLUSION
The analysis of existing section 104 with respect to recoveries
for lost earning capacity yields the interesting conclusion that sec-
tion 104 is neither categorically right nor wrong with respect to
plaintiffs. Rather, plaintiffs end up in the right position after taxes
under current section 104 if the damages are calculated in certain
ways. However, tort law has been slow to adapt to section 104. As a
result, plaintiffs are often overcompensated for human-capital
losses. Moreover, if court decisions adapt to section 104, many will
view such action as providing a "windfall" to defendants, who would
pay less than what plaintiffs receive. The optimal version of section
104 would "adapt" the tax treatment of the recovery for lost human
capital to the manner in which damages are computed under state
law, because states would not then be influenced by federal tax law.
Specifically, recoveries would be deemed to be "first" for lost
human capital. However, to be excludible any lump-sum recoveries
would be required to be reinvested in a wage-mimicking annuity. If
such an adaptive system is not adopted, then Congress must either
repeal or retain section 104. Despite the problems with section 104
in its current form, repeal is not necessarily the answer. States can
adapt to present section 104 without seriously undermining the de-
terrence and punishment functions of tort law, because these func-
tions, especially deterrence, can be achieved by punitive damages
and damages for noneconomic harms.
Punitive damages and damages for noneconomic harms, as op-
posed to recoveries for human capital, should not be excluded from
income. Such an exclusion is an unwise tax expenditure with no
sound basis in either tax theory or general policy. If lawmakers feel
sympathetic towards plaintiffs who are taxed on such recoveries,
they can enact tort rules to shift the burden to defendants. Finally,
including all recoveries in gross income other than, perhaps, certain
recoveries for human capital, would make section 104 much easier
to administer.
217 I.R.C. §§ 691(a), 1014(b).
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